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The current thesis project, entitled “Three Essays on Empirical Research in the 
Economics of Education", was developed under the direction and supervision of Dr. Luis 
Diaz Serrano, professor at the University Rovira i Virgili.  
 
The main motivation for this project lies in the importance of education across society 
and the influence that political institutions can have on the educational environment. 
The role of education in a society is widely discussed and accepted and can be 
summarized by the notion of human capital. The main idea is that each person’s 
education is an investment in human capital which allows the individual to contribute to 
society in a productive way. As an investment it is based on the hope of future benefits 
such as creating higher wages, lower risk of unemployment, higher productivity and so 
on, but it also has to be considered as an opportunity cost on students’ time and the initial 
cost in terms of direct spending.  
 
In addition to human capital, education also plays an important role in theories of social 
capital. Education exerts causal effects on outcomes such as mutual trust, civic behavior, 
social norms or crime, all of which are connected to the role of individuals in the society’s 
well-being. Together, both theories demonstrate the importance of education for the mid 
and long-term economic and social well-being improvement of societies.  
 
Here, the role of the political institutions is fundamental because in a welfare-state model 
they have to ensure the universality of this public service, at least in the first stages, and, 
at the same time, promote efficiency in order to exert a positive influence on economic 
growth and development. 
 
Against this background, the main aim of this thesis is to disentangle some of the 
relations between the different actors involved in education and political institutions. To 
achieve this goal we have developed three research papers with different methodologies, 
data and objectives but with the same common thread.  
 
The first chapter of this thesis is entitled “Decentralization and Academic Achievement: 
A Cross-Country Analysis”. This chapter draws inspiration from the low quality of 
student outcomes present in many developed countries and the recent tendency towards 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
THREE ESSAYS ON EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 
Enric Meix Llop 
 
9 
 
decentralization.  Countries initiate decentralization processes in order to allocate public 
resources in a more efficient way and this, basically, affects the three welfare state pillars: 
health, social protection and education. In the analysis we include not only fiscal 
decentralization but also political decentralization measures and, as such, we advance 
the literature, most of which focuses solely on fiscal issues.   
 
In order to overcome the problem of how to measure quality and efficiency in the 
provision of public services in the case of education, we have taken the academic 
achievement of students in compulsory education, as measured by the individual PISA 
scores, as a suitable measure of efficiency. Therefore, to conduct this analysis we 
collected fiscal decentralization data from the World Bank and political decentralization 
data from the Regional Authority Index at a country level. This data was then matched 
with individual PISA data that also comprises individual characteristics at personal, 
familial and school level. In respect of the empirical analysis, in the initial stage we used 
a fixed effects approach but here we detected a potential endogeneity problem since there 
may exist characteristics that affect both decentralization decisions and academic 
outcomes. To overcome this problem we also conducted an instrumental variables 
model.  
 
In the initial empirical stage, our results pointed towards the idea that only fiscal 
decentralization had an effect on students’ outcomes since the political decentralization 
variable was non-significant. Our results imply that countries with sub-national 
governments with the capacity to deliver and collect resources at a local level are able to 
obtain better academic outcomes. 
 
The instrumental variables analysis confirms and expands the results obtained with the 
fixed effects model. The impact of the fiscal decentralization variable remain positive and 
significant whereas the political decentralization variable exerts a negative and 
significant effect on students’ achievement. 
 
This analysis opens new paths for research because although we consider the temporal 
dimension of our data this is not a true panel. Specific data regarding decentralization in 
education and the creation of true panels will allow researchers to test our results and 
develop a more accurate picture of the findings we obtained.   
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The second chapter is entitled “Do Schools Discriminate Against Homosexual Parents? 
Evidence from an Internet Field Experiment”. In this case, the paper draws inspiration 
from a news item that appeared in the Spanish media highlighting homophobic 
behaviors towards homosexual parents in some Spanish schools. From this case a 
question emerged: is this discriminatory behavior from schools against homosexual 
parents generalized or is it simply an anecdotal case? Here, we also have to take into 
account that Spain was the third country in the world to promote a law recognizing 
homosexual marriage and child adoption rights but is also a country where the Catholic 
Church is present in some educational institutions. 
 
Although there is an abundance of literature that analyzes a wide range of discrimination 
issues, studies analyzing discrimination against homosexuals are still rare. However, the 
few studies that do address this issue reveal the existence of sexual orientation 
discrimination in labor and housing markets, mainly against male homosexuals. The 
existence of discrimination against female homosexuals is unclear. 
 
In order to answer this question we designed an internet field experiment creating three 
different fictitious profiles (heterosexual, male homosexual and female homosexual 
couples). We sent emails to all private and semi-private schools in the Catalan region 
during the child pre-registration period; in each email the sexuality of the parents was 
clearly stated and a request was made to visit the school visit and attend an interview. At 
this point, and after processing the emails, we created our own database in order to test 
whether schools were more hesitant to provide feedback to homosexual parents than to 
their heterosexual counterparts.  
 
Our findings are consistent with the previous literature regarding homosexual 
discrimination in other fields such as housing or labor. In comparison with heterosexual 
couples, male homosexual parents were 20 percentage points less likely to receive an 
answer from the school. Female homosexual couples were also less likely to receive an 
answer from schools (4 percentage points lower than heterosexual couples), however, 
this difference was not statistically significant. 
 
However, we cannot be sure that if we made a formal application for admission to the 
schools these applications from homosexual parents would be rejected. However, we 
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think that the fact that schools are more hesitant to interact with gay parents than with 
heterosexual couples is an indicator of the existence of some kind of subtle 
discrimination and prejudice against homosexual couples. 
 
The third and final chapter is entitled “Efficiency vs. equity in education: What do 
citizens value most?”. This research paper was developed with the aim of testing the 
extent to which citizens prefer welfare state policies that promote efficiency over those 
that promote equity.  
 
Policy makers are encouraged to pursue both efficiency and equity in order to maximize 
long-term benefits and reduce economic and social costs, but it is also commonly 
asserted that in most situations there is likely to be a trade-off between these two 
objectives. To the best of our knowledge there are no papers that have delved into how 
government implementation of policies related to the welfare state affect the citizens’ 
level of satisfaction. 
To analyze this question we used data from the European Social Survey, a cross-national 
survey that has been conducted every two years from 2002 to 2012. We used the six 
available waves and matched these with efficiency and equity proxies. For measures of 
efficiency we used the PISA country scores in mathematics, reading and science, and for 
equity variables we used the country gross enrolment rate for primary, secondary and 
tertiary levels. Finding measures of equity and efficiency is a difficult task but we believe 
that the chosen variables have allowed us to calibrate this effect.  
 
Our results suggest that the educational efficiency proxies had an unequivocal positive 
effect on citizens’ satisfaction with their educational system. In contrast, the results for 
the equity measures depend on which educational level is being analyzed. On the one 
hand, the universality measures for primary education have a negative and significant 
effect on all specifications whereas, on the other hand, this effect is positive for secondary 
and tertiary levels.  
 
From this result we observe that citizens do not positively value universality in the first 
stages of education. This result may be conditioned because developed countries have 
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enjoyed decades during which the entire child population has been enrolled at primary 
stages and this service is now taken for granted. 
 
Taking these three chapters together we make a case for the crucial role of political 
institutions in improving educational standards within a country. This role includes not 
only the fiscal structure but also the fight against discrimination and the implementation 
of policies that affect educational institutions. The task is not easy but politicians have to 
take serious consideration of the existing and developing economic literature which 
could help them to make better choices based on empirical data and research.  
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1 – Introduction 
In public economics, the relationship between the provision of universal public services 
and decentralization is a recurring issue. Despite its relevance, from an empirical point 
of view this link is undoubtedly under-researched. All studies devoted to analyzing the 
effects of decentralization focus on fiscal decentralization, while the role of political 
decentralization has been ignored. Also most of the existing studies analyze the issue on 
pure economic grounds, such as on economic growth, income inequality or the 
redistribution of wealth. Although economic growth or the reduction of poverty are 
desirable side effects, we think these studies lose sight that the main objective of 
decentralization is not economic growth or the redistribution of income, but better 
provision of public services to citizens. After all, the decentralization theorem (Oates, 
1972, 1999) is about delivering services closer to the people because of informational 
advantages of local governments in respect to economic or social characteristics of 
regions. Therefore, the impact of decentralization on efficiency in the provision of public 
services should receive more attention. Education, health and social protection should 
be at the core of the analyses, constituting the three pillars of the welfare state. We should 
expect these public services to be affected by decentralization processes. In this study we 
aim at covering these gaps by not only empirically analyzing the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on an objective measure of efficiency and quality of a public service, but 
also by analyzing for the first time the impact of political decentralization.  
 
One of the main problems in this type of empirical analyses is that it is very difficult to 
measure objectively the quality and the efficiency of the provision of public services. As 
is Barankay and Lockwood (2007), in this study we use students’ outcomes as a suitable 
proxy of this efficiency and quality. According to the decentralization theorem, fiscal and 
political decentralization should promote a more efficient provision of this public good, 
which one would expect to be translated into better student performance.  
 
The interest of this study is also boosted by the fact that in recent decades a tendency 
towards decentralization in many developed and developing countries has come into 
existence. Indeed, nowadays the amount of the global population residing in countries 
under some level of decentralization outnumbers those in totally centralized countries. 
Our results indicate that in more fiscally decentralized countries students perform better, 
while the impact of political decentralization on students’ outcomes is statistically 
significant and negative, but fairly small.  
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With the objectives described above, the paper is structured as follows: Section 2, 
provides the conceptual framework of the study; Section 3 reviews the literature related 
to decentralization and education; in Section 4 we present the empirical framework; 
Section 5 discusses the results; and finally Section 6 contains the conclusions. 
 
2 – Conceptual framework 
The use of the word decentralization has become increasingly common in both economic 
and political language, although there is not a clear definition for execution. In both the 
public and private sector the word decentralization implies a change of authority in favor 
of lower levels of governmental hierarchy. One of the first authors to study 
decentralization was Oates (1972), who established that decentralization, and thus 
bringing decisions closer to the population, improves social welfare by reducing 
information asymmetry allowing for a better adjustment between local supply and 
heterogeneous local demand. Thus, a decentralized system is expected to use public 
spending tightly tied to the preferences of the population, obtaining the corresponding 
benefits to society in terms of efficiency gains. Tax revenues by the sub-national 
governments provide incentives for good functioning of the decentralized system 
because when local expenditure is partly financed by their own tax revenues, local 
authorities become directly accountable to the voters in terms of where and how these 
taxes have been spent. Voters should be capable of evaluating correctly the performance 
of local governments. On the other hand, it is also possible that the different sub-national 
governments compete to establish better bundles of goods and services in order to 
maintain their tax bases or attract taxpayers from other regions, starting an expenditure 
competence. 
 
It may occur that decentralization does not improve public service provision when local 
communities do have the capacity to impose their views or local elites monopolize public 
resources according to their own preferences (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005). For 
example, if these elites do not make use of public health or education, they will push the 
government to spend on other items closer to their needs, which usually do not coincide 
with the needs of the rest of the population. Smith (1985) shows that decentralization in 
the provision of public services may not be efficient if sub-national governments are less 
technically capable than the national governments to properly distribute public goods. 
Rondinelli et al. (1984) identify the problem of using decentralization in order to serve 
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political objectives. In this way, the decentralization process is not evaluated by 
improvements in efficiency but also by how good or bad it satisfies the policy objectives. 
With this premise, it is common for central and sub-national governments to have some 
tolerance when decentralization reforms translate into inefficient processes if the policy 
objective is met and the quality of public services does not decrease to such an extent that 
society expresses its rejection.  
 
In the educational field, the need for decentralization comes from the new global 
economic conditions (McGinn and Welsh, 1999). The discussion on the efficiency of a 
decentralized education system has been preceded by the adoption of market policies by 
most countries in both developed and developing countries. The increase of the 
universality of education has resulted in an increased number of students enrolled in 
schools. Therefore, spending on education has also been increased. In this scenario, 
many governments face great budget concerns in educational matters which do not 
always translate into good results; this may involve an increase in the demand for skills 
on the part of governments. 
 
Some reasons why governments decide to initiate decentralization processes around 
education include seeking improvements in efficiency and financing and redistributing 
power to decision-making bodies with better knowledge of educational needs. The 
efficiency goal is argued for on the basis that a centralized system is often characterized 
as having a high bureaucratic burden, thus incurring losses of resources and time. By 
decentralizing decisions, they are accelerated and at the same time better information 
becomes available to operate. The efficient allocation of resources by sub-national 
governments allows better adjustment of the allocations in education as opposed to large 
national budgets, which are not always allocated efficiently. On the other hand, the 
redistribution of decision-making is seen as a way to include the less weighted groups, 
providing better facilities to attend to their needs. Currently, most educational systems 
are based on the distribution of responsibilities across different levels of government. It 
is common that the central government sets minimum requirements on the activities of 
sub-national governments, which implies that they are held accountable to central 
government. 
 
To our understanding, it is also important to distinguish between political and fiscal 
decentralization, since contrary to what one might expect, not all of the most fiscally 
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decentralized countries are the most politically decentralized and vice-versa (see Figure 
1). For instance, Germany, Switzerland, the United States or Canada combine high levels 
of both political and fiscal decentralization. However, countries such as Sweden or 
Denmark are characterized by high levels of fiscal decentralization combined with low 
levels of political decentralization, while in Italy and France it is the other way around. 
Countries such as England, Portugal, Luxembourg, Ireland, Iceland or Hungary exhibit 
low levels of both fiscal and political decentralization.  
 
Figure 1: Relationship between Fiscal and Political decentralization 
 
                                                               
 
3 – Overview of the empirical literature 
The decentralization theorem postulates that decentralization is unequivocally good for 
the improvement of the quality and efficiency of public services. Nonetheless, as we point 
out in the previous section, from a theoretical point of view some author’s highlight some 
situations in which the impact of decentralization could be negative. This circumstance 
suggest that some empirical evidence is necessary; however, the majority of empirical 
studies relate decentralization to both economic growth and inequality and the results 
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are not unambiguous. Another common feature of this literature is that it only considers 
the impact of fiscal decentralization, while political decentralization has generally been 
ignored. For instance, Davoodi and Zou (1998) in a study of 46 countries, and Rodríguez-
Pose and Ezcurra (2010) in a study of 21 OECD countries, find empirical evidence of a 
negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. Rodríguez-
Pose and Ezcurra (2010) also disaggregate expenditure and find that the portion for 
education has a negative relationship with economic growth. This negative relation 
increases as countries intensify their process of fiscal decentralization. In contrast, Iimi 
(2005) observes a positive relationship between decentralization and growth in GDP per 
capita. In an empirical study on Spain, Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2007) report ambiguous 
effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth depending on whether they 
consider an aggregated (negative) or regional (positive) level.  
 
Another important topic of discussion is the role of decentralization in the reduction of 
poverty and inequality. In this vein, the World Bank included decentralization as part of 
its poverty reduction program. However, under tax competition, the richer regions may 
be more attractive in respect to mobile factors due to the fact that they offer better human 
capital or better infrastructure. Under this premise and as Prud’homme (1995) points 
out, these regions will become richer and the poorer regions poorer. On the other hand, 
Ezcurra and Pascual (2008), Lessman (2009) and Qian and Weingast (1997) find that 
decentralization exerts a positive impact on the reduction of regional inequality. Thus 
less developed regions may offer attractive investment conditions such as more flexible 
labor markets, lower wages or lower tax rates. These investments could lead to improved 
processes of regional convergence. In the study by Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 
(2010), results vary depending on the level of total public expenditure. They conclude 
that fiscal decentralization could be a good way to reduce poverty if this represents a 
third or less of total spending. For higher levels, decentralization leads to an increase in 
levels of poverty. 
 
Recently, there has been growing interest in studying the non-economic dimension of 
decentralization. Thus, the literature linking decentralization and subjective well-being 
(SWB) seems to be taking off.1 The few existing empirical studies found that fiscal 
                                                          
1 In the literature devoted to study of the determinants of SWB, the terms SWB, happiness and life 
satisfaction are often interchangeable. 
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decentralization is important for SWB (Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Bjørnskov et al., 2008, 
Diaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012).  
 
As we mention earlier, we think that focusing on the implications of decentralization for 
overall economic growth and territorial disparities, poverty, interpersonal inequality or 
even SWB could be somewhat missing the point. While these factors may certainly be an 
indirect desirable consequence of decentralization, the original aim of decentralization 
is fundamentally to improve the delivery of public goods and services to individuals by 
the creation of more legitimate tiers of government, closer to the people and, therefore, 
more responsive to their needs and wants. Hence, examining the impact of 
decentralization on citizens’ satisfaction with political institutions and the delivery of 
public services seems a more suitable approach than establishing the link between 
decentralization and SWB or economic growth. In this regard, Diaz-Serrano and 
Rodríguez-Pose (2012) studied the effect of decentralization on citizens’ perceptions of 
political institutions (government, economy and democracy), while Diaz-Serrano and 
Rodríguez-Pose (2014) analyzed the link between decentralization and satisfaction with 
health and educational systems. On the one hand, they observed that fiscal and some 
forms of political decentralization have a positive and significant effect on SWB. On the 
other hand, they also found that fiscal decentralization has a different effect on 
perception of institutions depending on whether one considers revenues or expenditures. 
In the same way, political decentralization also has a varied effect on the level of 
satisfaction with institutions depending on the capacity of local governments to influence 
national politics or to exert authority over their own citizens.  
 
To our understanding, the link between decentralization and perception of institutions 
and public services is a more suitable approach for the understanding of the implications 
of decentralization for citizens than the one adopted in most of the previous studies. 
However, since satisfaction and perceptions are subjective outcomes, we also think that 
the analysis we propose here, i.e. the effect of decentralization on the quality and 
efficiency in the provision of public services using an objective measure as students’ 
outcomes, is undoubtedly better targeted on the problem.  
 
The literature analyzing the impact of decentralization using objective measures of the 
quality public services is quite scarce and only focuses on fiscal decentralization. To the 
best of our knowledge, the three studies that deal with this issue resort to educational 
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indicators. Using data from Swiss cantons, Barankay and Lockwood (2007) studied the 
impact of fiscal decentralization on the 19-year-old population obtaining university entry 
qualifications at county level. They observed that the relationship was positive. Using 
students’ performance from the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and American College 
Testing (ACT), Akai (2007) carried out the same analysis for the US and found that the 
effect of fiscal decentralization is not clear in primary levels but positive in secondary 
levels. Falch and Fischer (2012) were the first to test the effect of fiscal decentralization 
on students’ performance using cross-country data. They used aggregated test scores at 
a country level from different sources for 23 OECD countries and built a discontinuous 
panel.2 They found that decentralization of government expenditure has a positive 
impact on students’ performance.  
 
4 – Empirical framework and data 
4.1 – Empirical model 
Models on the determinants of academic achievement are generally represented by an 
Educational Production Function (hereafter, EPF). This function is used as a way to 
understand the production processes by estimating the effects of various inputs on 
academic performance. Generally, these inputs include information regarding students’ 
background (individual and family characteristics) and school characteristics. The usual 
EPF can be represented by the following linear relationship: 
 
is is s isA X Z       , 
(1) 
 
where isA  is the academic achievement for student i, studying at school s; isX  contains 
the variables that characterize the student; sZ is a set of school characteristics, which are 
equal for all students attending the same school; is  is a random error term; and , ,    
are the set of parameters to be estimated. Since our dataset consists of a pool of cross-
sections, regarding different countries and periods, we expand equation (1) as follows: 
                                                          
2 These authors used scores from the SIMS and SISS tests conducted by the International Association for 
the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) in 1980-81 and 1983-85, respectively. The IAE test in 
1990-91, IEA’s TIMSS tests in 1994-95 and 1998-99 and the OECD PISA test in 2000 were also utilized. 
 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
THREE ESSAYS ON EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 
Enric Meix Llop 
 
22 
 
 
isct isct sct ct c t istcA X Z Y             , 
(2) 
 
Where 

Yct  is a set of country characteristics including our variables of interest, i.e. 
political or fiscal decentralization; t  are time effects; and c  are unobserved specific 
country effects. Time effects are included as dummy variables and are considered in 
order to control for any unobserved temporary shock that can alter the response variable 
and are not picked up by any of the other variables. On the other hand, c are considered 
in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity at a country level. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of c , jointly with the other country specific variables, is also necessary in order 
to identify the effects of our variables of interest (fiscal and political decentralization), 
which are also country specific and vary throughout time. 
 
The estimation method selected to estimate equation (2) is a fixed-effects model, where 
the temporary effects, t , are introduced as dummy variables for each year. Country 
fixed-effects, c , are considered in order to control for country specific unobserved 
heterogeneity. If unobserved heterogeneity across countries (each country has its own 
specific characteristics that might influence the outcomes) is correlated with the 
covariates, then the fixed-effects model provides unbiased estimates. An alternative 
estimator would be the random-effects model; however, this estimator is inconsistent in 
the presence of correlation between the country fixed-effects and the covariates. 
 
4.2 – Data and variables 
4.2.1 – Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is students’ math scores. This variable is taken from the PISA. 
The PISA report is an internationally standardized study that provides academic results 
in the areas of math, science and reading.3 We focus only on math scores because we 
                                                          
3 In the PISA database, students’ scores are presented in the form of five plausible values for each subject. 
The plausible values are students’ imputed values that are similar to the individual test scores and have 
approximately the same distribution as the measured latent feature. They were developed in order to obtain 
consistent estimates of population characteristics in assessing situations where there are not enough 
resources to make an accurate estimate of their abilities. 
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think that of the three tests this is the one that provides the most comparable outcome 
across countries. There are four available waves conducted in a total of 43 countries in 
2000, 41 countries in 2003, 57 countries in 2006 and 65 countries in the last edition of 
2009. We restrict our analysis to those countries that have participated in the four waves 
of PISA.  
 
In Table 1 we report descriptive statistics of students’ scores in math skills by country. 
This summary of statistics does not refer to all the countries participating in the PISA, 
but to the 22 countries in our final sample. We can see that the best five performing 
countries in mathematics are Finland, Holland, Switzerland, Belgium and Canada. The 
worst math results are obtained by Portugal, followed by the United States, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Hungary. 
 
4.2.2 – Independent variables  
The PISA data also collects information regarding the school, as well as the student and 
their family environment. Student and household characteristics considered in this study 
are gender, age, effort (weekly hours of study), birthplace of the student and their 
parents, the number of books they have at home and the cultural level of the father and 
mother.4 The school characteristics are city size, the type of school (public, private school 
independent of government and government-dependent private school) and the ratio 
between the number of students and teachers. In table A1 in the annex we describe the 
individual variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 This level is measured by the International Standard Classification of Education , which refers to the 
standardized classification of the different educational levels established by UNESCO, which allows 
comparison between countries. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for students’ scores in math by country 
  Maths  
  mean s.d. rank 
Australia  515.72 90.16 6 
Austria  506.25 90.15 9 
Belgium  525.91 101.16 4 
Canada  519.02 83.03 5 
Denmark  503.84 85.10 11 
Finland  542.51 77.38 1 
France   504.07 91.36 10 
Germany  506.74 96.07 8 
Hungary  492.08 87.65 18 
Iceland  509.20 84.80 7 
Ireland  498.60 80.46 14 
Italy  485.01 89.07 20 
Luxembourg  490.36 90.02 19 
The Netherlands  538.52 85.81 2 
Norway  494.56 85.19 17 
Poland  495.65 85.73 15 
Portugal  474.14 85.84 22 
Spain  494.84 86.28 16 
Sweden  502.56 88.42 12 
Switzerland  526.30 91.24 3 
United Kingdom  500.88 86.08 13 
United States  480.71 87.63 21 
 Source: Own computations based on PISA data 
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Decentralization data is divided into political and fiscal decentralization. Political 
decentralization indexes are taken from Hooghe et al. (2008) (Regional Authority 
Index). This data covers 42 countries for the period 1950-2006. As a measure of political 
decentralization we use an aggregated index (self-rule), which is a measure of the 
authority exercised by sub-national governments over their own citizens. This index is 
the aggregation of other indexes picking up the level of autonomy in some aspects such 
as policy-making, taxes or representation. On the other hand, fiscal decentralization 
variables consist of yearly indicators calculated as the ratio between sub-national and 
national expenditures or revenues covering the period 1972-2005. The source of these 
variables is the Government Finance Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. We 
have to mention that our measures of fiscal and political decentralization are not specific 
for education. However, we should expect that a more decentralized country in the 
broader sense will be also more decentralized regarding universal public services such as 
education or health. In order to identify the effect of fiscal and political decentralization 
on students’ outcomes, in addition to the country-level fixed effects, we also include the 
GDP per capita at constant 2000 prices as a country-level variable. In table A2 in the 
annex we describe the decentralization variables. 
 
In Table 2 we show a statistical summary of these variables. We observe that 49% of our 
sample are female students and the mean age is 15.78 years. Around 7% of the students 
were born in a country different to that in which they conducted the PISA evaluation and 
15% of the sample had parents born in a foreign country. Regarding the number of books 
they own at home, around 30% of students declared they had between 11 and 50 books. 
The mean level of parents’ education is upper-secondary education (nearly post-
secondary, non-tertiary education). One third of the students study in schools located in 
medium-sized towns (15,000 to 100,000 inhabitants) and the school size/teacher ratio 
is around 12.4%. The share of public schools is almost 83%, while 14.2% are private but 
government dependent and only 2% are fully private schools. 
 
In order to test the impact of decentralization on academic achievement we matched the 
PISA database with the decentralization data. All students surveyed within the scope of 
PISA data collection and residing in the same country are assigned with the same value 
of the corresponding decentralization indicator. In this matching, we have not only taken 
into consideration the spatial but also the appropriate time horizon. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the independent variables 
 Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Female 569,953 0,4998 0,5000 
Age 569,953 15,7805 0,2914 
Student born in foreign country 560,724 0,0723 0,2590 
Mother born in foreign country 558,636 0,1534 0,3603 
Father born in foreign country 555,086 0,1524 0,3594 
1 - 10 Books 557,882 0,1360 0,3427 
11 - 50 Books 557,882 0,3022 0,4592 
51 - 100 Books 557,882 0,2008 0,4006 
101 - 250 Books 557,882 0,1642 0,3705 
251 - 500 Books 557,882 0,1015 0,3020 
More than 500 557,882 0,0062 0,0790 
Father isced qualification 528,346 3,9647 1,6159 
Mother isced qualification 543,691 3,9947 1,5783 
Village ( less 3.000) 537,575 0,1104 0,3134 
Small town (3.000 to 15.000) 537,575 0,2585 0,4378 
Town (15.000 to 100.000) 537,575 0,3388 0,4733 
City (100.000 to 1.000.000) 537,575 0,2128 0,4093 
Large city (more 1.000.000) 537,575 0,0793 0,2702 
School size / number of teachers ratio 505,920 12,4313 4,4954 
Public 501,396 0,8293 0,3762 
Private, government dependent 501,396 0,1422 0,3492 
Private, government independent 501,396 0,0284 0,1663 
Log GDP pc constant 2000 571,043 9,9633 0,4590 
Log GDP pc constant 2000, squared 571,043 99,4799 8,7929 
Self Rule 571,043 13,7559 5,8316 
Sub-national expenditure 571,043 0,3491 0,1312 
Sub-national current expenditure 571,043 0,6038 0,1681 
Sub-national revenue 571,043 0,3592 0,1318 
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We assign to each country the average of the last ten years of the decentralization index 
prior to each PISA wave. Since decentralization indexes are comprised between 1965 and 
2006, for the PISA wave of 2009 we assign the same values of the decentralization 
indexes as in 2006. Our decentralization data covers a more reduced number of countries 
than the PISA database; therefore, our final sample is composed of 22 countries. In Table 
3 we report sample sizes by country and year. 
 
Table 3: Observations by country and year 
 2000 2003 2006 2009 
Australia 1.122 12.551 14.170 14.251 
Austria 1.091 4.597 4.927 6.590 
Belgium 1.563 8.796 8.857 8.501 
Canada 6.626 27.953 22.646 23.207 
Denmark 957 4.218 4.532 5.924 
Finland 1.085 5.796 4.714 5.810 
France  1.044 4.300 4.716 4.298 
Germany 1.157 4.660 4.891 4.979 
Hungary 1.229 4.765 4.490 4.605 
Iceland 743 3.350 3.789 3.646 
Ireland 849 3.880 4.585 3.937 
Italy 1.109 11.639 21.773 30.905 
Luxembourg 785 3.923 4.567 4.622 
The Netherlands 553 3.992 4.871 4.760 
Norway 918 4.064 4.692 4.660 
Poland 771 4.383 5.547 4.917 
Portugal 1.030 4.608 5.109 6.298 
Spain 1.362 10.791 19.604 25.887 
Sweden 976 4.624 4.443 4.567 
Switzerland 1.385 8.420 12.192 11.812 
United Kingdom 2.078 9.535 13.152 12.179 
United States 843 5.454 5.611 5.233 
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5 – Econometric results 
5.1 – Fixed-effects estimation 
In Table 4 and 5, we show the results of the estimation of equation (2). In order to avoid 
potential multicollinearity or overlapping effects, we estimated a separate model for each 
decentralization measure. In Table 4 we report the estimated effects for the student, 
school and country specific characteristics, except decentralization. In all the 
specifications, estimated coefficients associated with these variables behave according to 
expectations and to what other previous studies using PISA data find. Girls do worse than 
boys in math.  A positive link between the number of books at home, the educational 
attainment of the parents and students’ math scores also exists. In contrast, foreign-born 
students or students with foreign-born parents perform worse. School characteristics 
also turned out to be statistically significant in determining students’ math scores. 
Students in private and semi-private schools do report higher scores than their 
counterparts studying in public schools. We also observed a positive link between city 
size and students’ math scores. One interesting result regards the impact of the variable 
GDP. We observe that this variable is inverted (U-shape) per capita in respect to 
students’ math scores, i.e. the impact of the GDP per capita on students’ achievement is 
positive but decreasing. This may explain why countries on top of the income distribution 
are not on top of the PISA rankings.  
 
Results regarding the impact of our key explanatory variables, i.e. fiscal and political 
decentralization, are reported in Table 5. In our linear fixed-effects estimates (FE), our 
indicator of political decentralization and sub-national expenditure are not statistically 
significant, while sub-national current expenditure and sub-national revenue exert a 
positive and significant impact on students’ achievements. However, the results provided 
by the linear fixed-effects model should be taken with caution, since our decentralization 
variables are likely to be endogenous. It is possible that unobserved factors affecting 
students’ achievement in a given country may also determine the propensity of this 
country to decentralize. This situation may generate inconsistent estimates of the 
parameters associated with our explanatory variables of interest. In order to fix this 
problem we resort to the instrumental variable (IV) estimator, which is explained in 
more detail in the next subsection. Since the IV estimator provides more suitable results, 
we will focus our comments regarding the impact of decentralization on this model.  
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 Table 4: Fixed effects estimation of equation (2) 
 
   Coeff. s.d. 
Individual characteristics   
Female -0.0300*** (0.0024) 
Age 0.00656*** (0.0008) 
Student born in foreign country -0.0270*** (0.0047) 
Mother born in foreign country -0.0160** (0.0060) 
Father born in foreign country -0.0222*** (0.0063) 
Books at home (Base: None)   
1 - 10 Books 0.0468*** (0.0032) 
11 - 50 Books 0.109*** (0.0057) 
51 - 100 Books 0.146*** (0.0071) 
101 - 250 Books 0.184*** (0.0081) 
251 - 500 Books 0.189*** (0.0087) 
More than 500 0.219*** (0.0112) 
Father isced qualification 0.00911*** (0.0009) 
Mother isced qualification 0.00833*** (0.0009) 
 
School characteristics 
 
 
Location (Base: village, less 3.000)  
Small town (3.000 to 15.000) 0.0138*** (0.0034) 
Town (15.000 to 100.000) 0.0213*** (0.0050) 
City (100.000 to 1.000.000) 0.0228*** (0.0050) 
Large city (more 1.000.000) 0.0275** (0.0113) 
School size / number of teachers ratio 0.00215* (0.0011) 
School type (Base: public)   
Private, government dependent 0.0196** (0.0094) 
Private, government independent 0.0338** (0.0136) 
 
Country characteristics 
 
 
1.262*** 
(0.3930) L g GDP pc constant prices 2000 
Log GDP pc constant prices 2000, squared -0 0715 * (0.0228) 
Constant 0.58 (1.1760) 
Observations  415,467 
R-squared   0.188 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Time dummy variables included. Robust standard errors estimation. 
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Table 5: Fixed-effects and IV fixed-effects estimation of equation (2), decentralization variables 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 FE IV  FE IV  FE IV  FE IV 
Self-Rule -0.001 -0.0321***          
 (0.0057) (0.0038)          
 -0.0001 -0.0051***          
Sub-national expenditure    0.0701 0.919***       
    (0.1980) (0.1390)       
    0.0112 0.1479***       
Sub-nat. current expenditure       0.250*** 1.089***    
       (0.0239) (0.0879)    
       0.0401*** 0.1752***    
Sub-national revenue          0.577*** 0.962*** 
          (0.1730) (0.2020) 
          0.0927*** 0.1547*** 
            
Instruments  Ideology   Ideology   Ideology   Ideology 
  Urban Pop.   Total Land   Lag revenue    Lag expense 
            
Underidentification test   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
Weak identification test   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
Hansen J statistic   0.4774   0.2455   0.1258   0.3092 
Endogeneity test   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0343 
            
Observations 415,467 415,467  415,467 415,467  415,467 405,055  415,467 405,055 
R-squared 0.188 0.186  0.187 0.186  0.175 0.184  0.188 0.186 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Elasticity in italics. Time dummy variables included. Robust standard errors estimation.
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5.2 – Instrumental variables estimation 
Any estimation that relies on IVs is always interesting since it requires the challenging, 
but not always fruitful, exercise of finding suitable instruments. In our case, in order to 
find good instruments, we consulted Arzaghi and Henderson (2005). These authors 
disentangle the underlying factors leading sub-national governments to demand regional 
decentralization and federalism. They found that the move to decentralization increases 
with the national income growth, the relative sub-national population, the country size 
and the degree of democratization. Therefore, we tried to find our instruments from this 
list of variables. The idea behind this choice is that some of these variables promoting 
decentralization are correlated with our decentralization key variables but not 
necessarily with students’ academic outcomes. Lagged values of the decentralization 
variables are also considered as instruments, since lagged values are usually not 
correlated with the disturbance term (Iimi, 2005). In each wave, for the ten year average 
values of our decentralization variables used as explanatory, we consider the ten year 
average of the same decentralization variable, but consider the ten years previous to the 
ten years used as independent variable. That is, if in the PISA wave of 2004 we average 
the annual fiscal decentralization values between 1994 and 2004, the corresponding 
instrument will consist of an average of the same variable but averaging the values 
between 1984 and 1994.  
 
After running a number of alternative models, from all variables mentioned above we 
use the land area of the country, the ideology of the central government and the lag of 
some decentralization variables as instruments. As Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) point 
out, democratic or political variables influence any decentralization process. Land area 
of the country represents the degree of spatial dispersion, from central public services to 
sub-national regions. Urban concentration represents the relative degree of economic 
and population centralization, measured as ratio between the population of the largest 
urban area and the total population of the country. Some countries are influenced and 
dominated by a city, sometimes the national capital, located in the dominant region. In 
Table 5 we report the results of the IV estimation. For the sake of brevity, we only report 
the coefficients and elasticity regarding our variables of interest. Political 
decentralization is instrumented with ideology and urban concentration (model 1), while 
the instruments of our fiscal decentralization variables are the following: sub-national 
expenditure is combined with total land area and ideology (model 2); sub-national 
current expenditure with ideology and the lag of sub-national revenue (model 3); and 
sub-national revenue with ideology and the lag of sub-national expenses (model 4).  
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In all models we do not reject the null hypothesis of endogeneity, which strengthens the 
adoption of the IV approach. According to the Hansen Test of over identifying 
restrictions we have good instruments in all cases, since we don’t reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. In addition, we 
also reject the null hypotheses of under-identification and weak identification. The 
results of these tests taken together suggest that our IV estimation performs quite well. 
Indeed, results reported in Table 5 reveal that compared with the consistent estimates 
provided by the IV estimator, the coefficients obtained through the fixed-effects 
estimator are biased downwards. All coefficients associated with our four 
decentralization variables estimated with the IV estimator turned out to be statistically 
significant at the one percent level. In order to allow for comparisons across alternative 
models, in Table 2 we also report estimated elasticity. Our results indicate that political 
decentralization exerts a negative impact on students’ outcomes, though this effect is 
fairly small, whereas the estimated effect of fiscal decentralization is unambiguously 
positive and more important in magnitude from both the expenditure and revenue sides. 
Indeed, the three estimated elasticities associated with the fiscal decentralization 
variables are quite similar in size. A one percent increase in the level of sub-national 
expenditure, current expenditure and revenue increases students’ outcomes by 0.148%, 
0.175% and 0.155%, respectively.  
 
6 – Conclusions 
This paper goes beyond the traditional economic growth and territorial disparity 
analyses which have been at the heart of most studies of fiscal – and to a lesser extent 
political – decentralization until recently. A very limited number of more recent studies 
have also ventured into the black box of how institutions affect the assessment of the 
provision of basic public services linked to the welfare state by individuals. However, we 
think that this paper goes one step beyond, as in Barankay and Lockwood (2007) or Falch 
and Fischer (2012), by analyzing the impact of decentralization on the efficiency of the 
provision of public goods such as education. Thus, this paper put the spotlight on the 
ultimate goal of decentralization: the improvement of the delivery of policies and services 
to citizens. As far as we know, our study is indeed the first that also considers political 
decentralization in this type of analysis, in addition to fiscal decentralization.  
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In our analysis, we proxy the efficiency in the provision of education through students’ 
outcomes. To do so, we resort to four waves of the PISA micro-data (2000, 2003, 2006 
and 2009). Given the endogenous nature of the decentralization variables we estimate 
the impact of decentralization on student outcomes using the IV approach. Our results 
indicate that fiscal decentralization exerts a positive impact on student outcomes, while 
the impact of political decentralization is negative. The latter, though it is statistically 
significant, estimated effect is fairly close to zero.  
 
Our results are quite revealing, since they suggest that the capacity of sub-national 
governments to deliver is what really matters in terms of more efficient provision of 
public goods, whereas the capacity to decide plays a limited role. Therefore we highlight 
that the impact of decentralization on the production of public services is not 
unambiguous. These results are in line with Diaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose (2014), 
who found that fiscal decentralization exerts a positive impact on citizens’ assessment of 
the education system,5 whereas the impact of political decentralization is negative. This 
coincidence between citizens’ subjective perception and the objective performance of the 
education system suggests that citizens are able to do an assessment of the provision of 
a public good such as education.  
 
We can conclude that the benefits of decentralization will very much depend on how 
efficient regional local governments are at delivering their policies. That is, sub-national 
governments should have a more equitable mix of political and fiscal decentralization. 
We think our results contributes to what should be a wider approach to a better 
understanding of the implications of different forms and levels of government on the 
perception of the delivery of basic public welfare services.  
 
 
  
                                                          
5 Diaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose (2014) refer to the European Social Survey to carry out this analysis. 
Citizens’ assessment of the education system is measured on an eleven-point Likert scale. 
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ANNEX OF TABLES 
Table A1: Description of the variables regarding individuals, schools and country.
  
Variable Description 
Individual characteristics 
Female Dummy that takes value 1 if the individual is female. 
Age Age of the student 
Student born in foreign 
country 
Dummy that takes value 1 if the student was not born in the 
country of performance of the test 
Mother born in foreign 
country 
Dummy that takes value 1 if the mother of the student was not 
born in the country of performance of the test 
Father born in foreign Dummy that takes value 1 if the father was not born in the country 
of performance of the test 
Books at home Number of books that the individual has at home. Can take the 
values  none, 1 to 10, 11 to 50, 51 to 100, 101 to 250, 251 to 500 and 
more than 500 
Father isced qualification Father ISCED rating 
0: preschool 
1: primary 
2: low secondary education  
3: high secondary education 
4: postsecondary education  
5: low tertiary education, diplomas, degrees and postgraduate 
6: high tertiary education, doctoral and master certain, includes 
part of research 
Mother isced qualification Mother ISCED rating 
School characteristics 
Location It takes the following values depending on where the school is 
located: 
Village: less than 3,000 inhabitants 
Small town: between 3,000 and 15,000 inhabitants 
Town: between 15,000 and 100,000 
City: between 100,000 and 1,000,000 people 
Large city: more than 1,000,000 inhabitants 
School type Can take the following values: 
Public: if the school is owned by the government 
Private: If the school is private and independent of government 
Private government-dependent 
School size/teachers ratio Ratio between number of students and teachers 
Country characteristics 
GDP per capita constant 
prices 2000 
PIB per capita constant 2000 prices 
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Table A2: Description of the decentralization variables 
Self Rule (SR) = 
ID+PS+FA+RP 
 
The authority 
exercised by a 
regional 
government over 
those who live in 
the region. 
 
Institutional depth 
(ID) 
 
Extent to which a 
regional government is 
autonomous rather 
than deconcentrated 
0: no functioning general-purpose at the regional level 
1: deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration 
2: non-deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration 
subject to central government veto 
3: non deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration 
not subject to central government veto 
 
Policy Scope (PS) 
 
Range of policies for 
which a regional 
government is 
responsible 
0: no authoritative competencies over economic policy, 
cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy 
1: authoritative competencies in one area: economic 
policy, cultural-educational policy welfare state policy 
2: authoritative competencies in at least two areas: 
economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state 
policy 
3: authoritative competencies in at least two areas above, 
and in at least two of the following: residual powers, 
police, authority over own institutional set-up, local 
government. 
4: regional government meets the criteria for 3, and has 
authority over immigration or citizenship 
 
Fiscal Autonomy 
(FA)  
 
Extent to which a 
regional government 
can independently tax 
it’s population 
0: the central government sets base of rate of all regional 
taxes 
1: the regional government sets the rate of minor taxes 
2: the regional government sets base and rate of minor 
taxes 
3: the regional government sets the rate of at least one 
major tax: personal income, corporate, value added or 
sales tax 
4: the regional government sets base rate of at least one 
major tax: personal income, corporate, value added or 
sales tax 
 
Representation 
(RP)  
 
Extent to which a 
region is endowed with 
an independent 
legislature and 
executive. 
0: no regional assembly 
1: an indirectly elected regional assembly 
2: a directly elected assembly 
3: the regional executive is appointed by central 
government 
4: dual executives appointed by central government and 
the regional assembly 
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5: the regional executive is appointed by a regional 
assembly or directly elected 
 
Fiscal 
decentralization 
Subnational 
Expenditure 
Indicator: Subcentral Expenditure/General Expenditure 
Definition Expenditure: (State Government + Local 
Government)/(Central Government-Social Security + 
State Government + Local Government) 
Subnational 
Current 
Expenditure 
Indicator: Subcentral Current Expenditure/General 
Current Expenditure 
Definition Current Expenditure: (State Government + 
Local Government)/(Central Government-Social Security 
+ State Government + Local Government) 
Subnational 
Revenue 
Indicator: Subcentral Revenuy & Grants/General Revenue 
and Grants 
Definition Revenue & Grants: (State Government+Local 
Government)/(Central Government-Social Security+State 
Government+Local Government) 
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Evidence from an Internet  
Field Experiment 
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1- Introduction 
 
Although there is an abundance of literature that analyzes a wide range of discrimination 
issues against women and minorities, studies analyzing discrimination against 
homosexuals are rare. The few studies that do address this issue document the existence of 
sexual orientation discrimination. Given the recent implementation of policies in favor of 
homosexual rights and the normalization of homosexual families in many developed 
countries, we find this issue to be of special interest. Despite its relevance, we think that 
discrimination against homosexuals is undoubtedly under- researched. The main reason 
for this gap is attributable to the lack of reliable register and survey data for identifying 
sexual orientation.  
 
Some studies that have relied on survey and register data in different countries report 
statistically significant earnings differentials across individuals/households according to 
their sexual orientation. However, because of the problems mentioned above in identifying 
individuals’ sexual orientation, internet field experiments seem to be a more reliable 
method to test for discrimination against homosexuals. Experiments have focused on the 
labor and the rental housing markets. Studies of the labor market found that, compared to 
heterosexual applicants with similar characteristics, gay men and lesbians were less likely 
to be invited for a job interview. In the rental housing market this type of discrimination 
was observed only for gay male applicants.  
 
In this paper we test whether private schools are more hesitant about interacting with 
homosexual rather than with heterosexual parents. The experiment was conducted in the 
region of Catalonia (Spain) during the pre-registration period in schools. Pre-registration is 
compulsory and has to take place before schools, either public or private, decide on 
children’s admittance. However, parents are only able to make choices among private 
schools because in the public school sector the assignment of children to schools depends 
on the geographical proximity of the home address to the school. This is why our experiment 
only considers private schools.  
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The primary motivation for this paper stemmed from a news report in the media. On 
February 24th 2012, the main national Spanish newspaper El País published the following 
news story: “The principal of a school was accused in court of turning down the application 
by a gay couple for their son”. This happened in a private school in Seville. The principal of 
the school turned down the application, alleging that there were no vacancies. However, the 
parents of the child knew this to be untrue and, therefore, took the case to the Court of 
Justice. Of course, one case does not in itself infer that most Spanish schools discriminate 
against homosexual parents. However, one question that emerges from this case of 
discrimination asks whether the discriminatory behavior of this school against this 
homosexual couple is a general problem or whether this can only be taken as anecdotal 
evidence. This is the question we want to address in this paper. In order to do so, we 
designed an internet field experiment with schools in the region of Catalonia (Spain). As far 
as we are aware, this is first paper to analyze whether schools discriminate against 
homosexual parents. We focus on this type of discrimination not only because it affects 
homosexual parents, but because it also affects the education of their children; which is one 
of their most fundamental rights. 
 
Our internet field experiment involved the creation of three different fictitious profiles 
(heterosexual, male homosexual and female homosexual couples) and sending emails to 
schools during the pre-registration period. We decided to include female homosexual 
couples in order to control for the gender of the homosexual parents. We thought that in 
some cases schools or school principals might penalize not only the sexual orientation of 
the parents but also the lack of a maternal figure. In these emails our fictitious couples 
showed interest in the school and made a request for an interview and a visit. In the emails 
their sexual orientation was made explicit. After processing all the email responses from the 
schools, we created a database that allowed us to test whether schools were more hesitant 
to give feedback to homosexual parents than to their heterosexual counterparts. Our results 
indicate that male homosexual parents were 22.5 percentage points less likely, in 
comparison with heterosexual couples, to receive a response from the schools. Female 
homosexual couples were also less likely to receive a response from the schools (almost 4 
percentage points less). However, the latter was not statistically significant. These findings 
are consistent with previous evidence based on internet field experiments that tested for 
discrimination against homosexuals. 
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The paper is structured as follows. In section two we describe the institutional setting. In 
section three we provide an overview of the existing literature regarding homosexual 
discrimination. The experimental design is described in section four and section five reports 
the empirical results. The final section summarizes and concludes.  
 
2. Homosexual families and institutional settings 
 
The recognition of homosexual rights is a controversial issue in many countries. In 2001, 
the Netherlands was the first country in the world to recognize same-sex couples marriage. 
Since then, this right has also been recognized in other countries.6 More recently, other 
countries have granted homosexual couples the right to adopt children.7 Both measures aim 
to recognize and normalize homosexual family structures. Despite these advances, there are 
some countries where homosexuality is still persecuted and punished, in some cases by the 
death penalty.8 
 
Spain was the third country in the world (after the Netherlands and Belgium) to introduce 
a law recognizing marriage between same-sex couples. It was promoted by PSOE9 (the left-
wing party in office) and became effective on the 3rd July 2005. It faced opposition from 
the Catholic Church and the PP (the main right-wing party), who claimed that this law was 
against the Spanish Constitution and took the case to the Spanish Constitutional Court. 
However, in 2012 their appeal was rejected. Under the same law, homosexual couples were 
also granted the same rights to adopt children as heterosexual couples.10 Since then, with 
the support of the main right-wing party (PP), the Catholic Church and catholic pro-family 
conservative associations have organized several demonstrations against the right of 
homosexual couples to adopt children.  
                                                          
6 South-Africa, Portugal, Spain, Iceland, Argentina, Denmark, Uruguay, New Zealand, France and Brazil allow 
homosexual marriages whilst in United States and Mexico it is only allowed in some states.  
7 Andorra, Argentina, Spain, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Norway, South-Africa, Sweden, UK, Uruguay, 
Finland, Germany, Israel and Slovenia allow homosexuals to adopt children, whereas in Australia, Mexico and the 
United States it is only allowed in some states. 
8 Countries where homosexuality is punished with the death penalty are Libya, Sudan, Mauritania, Nigeria, 
Somaliland, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Iran and the Maldives. 
9 The House of Representatives approved the law on the first round by 183 votes against 136. In the Senate the law 
was rejected by 131 votes to 119. In Congress, the veto was lifted and the law finally passed by 187 votes to 147. 
10 Law 13/2005, article 44. 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
THREE ESSAYS ON EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 
Enric Meix Llop 
 
44 
 
 
In this context, one question arises: is the polarization reflected in Parliament also reflected 
in society and institutions? The European Value Study positions Spain in a middle position 
regarding homosexual acceptance as compared to other EU15 countries.11 About 20% of the 
Spaniards interviewed for the study declared that they did not like the idea of having 
homosexuals as neighbors (Figure 1). Portugal, Austria, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Germany 
have exhibited higher levels of intolerance, with the Nordic countries, Netherlands, France 
and Belgium emerging as the most tolerant.   
 
However, when we analyze the question of whether individuals agree with the adoption of 
children by homosexual couples, the results differ across the board. Some countries that 
reported a greater tolerance of having homosexuals as neighbors, exhibited a similar or even 
more negative position than Spaniards towards the idea of homosexuals adopting children 
(Sweden, France, Finland, Denmark and Belgium). This leaves Spain as one of the most 
tolerant EU countries regarding this issue (Figure 2). 
 
                   Figure 1: Don’t like homosexuals as neighbors 
 
      Source: Own elaboration from European Value Study 
                                                          
11 This study shows that the ex-communist European countries are by far the most homophobic. 
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                   Figure 2: Children adoption homosexual couples 
 
Note: 1 strongly agree; 5 strongly disagree. 
Source: Own elaboration from European Value Study 
 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
Although economic literature regarding sexual orientation discrimination is scarce, the 
existence of discrimination against homosexuals is documented in some countries. The 
majority of these studies are focused on differences between homosexuals and 
heterosexuals in the labor market. These analyses generally rely on surveys and register 
data and, to a lesser extent, on internet field experiments. More recently, internet field 
experiments have also been used to detect discrimination against homosexuals in the rental 
housing market. As far as we are aware there is no previous study that explores 
discrimination against homosexual parents on the specific issue of their children being 
admitted to schools, or in any other more general issue regarding the school environment. 
 
Using U.S. survey data, Badgett (1995) found that male homosexual and bisexual workers 
earn between 11% and 27% less than their heterosexual counterparts. However, Allegretto 
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and Arthur (2001) found that this wage differential can, in part, be attributed to a penalty 
for being unmarried. They found that unmarried male homosexuals earn 15% less than 
similarly qualified married heterosexuals but only 2.4% less than unmarried male 
heterosexuals.  
 
Arabsheibani et al. (2004, 2005) conducted the first study in the UK analyzing earnings 
discrimination against homosexuals. They found that male homosexuals had lower 
earnings than similarly qualified heterosexuals whereas female homosexuals earned about 
the same and, in some cases, more than heterosexuals. This implies that the wage gender 
gap is larger among heterosexual workers than among homosexuals. Plug and Berkhout 
(2004) examined whether such differences in incomes in the Netherlands occur at the 
beginning of working careers or whether it is a more long-term phenomenon. They found 
that wage differentials due to sexual orientation are lower in entry level jobs — 3% less for 
male homosexuals and 4% more for female homosexuals — when compared with similarly 
qualified heterosexual workers.  
 
Laurent and Mihoubi (2012) found that male homosexuals earned about 6.5% less than 
heterosexual men. However, using German household data, Humpert (2012) found the 
opposite. He estimated that male homosexual household income was between 9% and 15% 
higher than that of heterosexual households although no differences were found between 
female homosexual households and heterosexual households. Plug and Berkhout (2008) 
observed that gays/bisexuals earned about 3–4 percent less than male heterosexual 
workers. However, they point out that this result is driven by selection and not by 
discrimination. More recently, using Australian data, Plug et al. (2014) found evidence that 
gay and lesbian workers shied away from prejudiced occupations — a finding that supports 
the prejudice-based theories of employer and employee discrimination against gay and 
lesbian workers.  
 
The results of labor market outcomes based on survey and register data have limitations for 
detecting discrimination against homosexuals. First, sexual orientation is not generally 
observable or declared and, therefore, sexual orientation might not be known to other co-
workers or employers. Thus, any potentially discriminatory attitude towards them cannot 
be observed. Second, although survey and register data often ask individuals to report if 
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they have had any same-sex sexual relations during their life, this might not provide an 
accurate identification of homosexuality. With internet field experiments it is possible to 
overcome these identification problems. Using this approach we can create situations in 
which people are interacting with fictitious homosexual individuals who clearly reveal their 
sexual orientation. Existing internet field experiments intended to detect discrimination 
against homosexuals focus on labor and housing market outcomes. Despite the literature 
being scarce, all the studies report one unequivocal finding: male homosexuals are 
discriminated against in the labor and the rental housing markets, whilst in the case of 
female homosexuals the evidence of discrimination remains inconclusive. 
 
Ahmed et al. (2008b) conducted a field experiment in Sweden to analyze whether 
homosexual couples showing interest by email in renting a flat were less likely to receive 
feedback from private landlords than were heterosexual couples. They found that male 
homosexual couples had a lower response rate from landlords than did heterosexual 
couples. However, they found no difference in treatment by landlords between female 
homosexual couples and heterosexuals.  
 
In terms of the labor market, several internet field experiments have aimed at detecting 
sexual orientation discrimination in the hiring process. These studies report discrimination 
against both male and female homosexuals. Adam (1981) found evidence of discrimination 
against male homosexuals applying for articling positions in Ontario law firms. 
Weichselbaumer (2003) observed that in Germany, female homosexuals received fewer 
interview requests than female heterosexuals with the same skills. Tilcsik (2011) conducted 
the first large-scale audit study in the United States regarding sexual orientation 
discrimination. Fictitious résumés were sent to job postings in different states. In some 
résumés the individual’s homosexual status was randomly signaled by mentioning that the 
candidate had experience in gay campus organizations. The author found discrimination 
against those who revealed their homosexuality. Ahmed et al. (2013) found that sexual 
orientation discrimination exists in the Swedish labor market. They observed that the gay 
male applicant was discriminated against in typical male-dominated occupations, whereas 
the lesbian applicant was discriminated against in typical female-dominated occupations.  
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4. Experimental design 
 
The experiment on which this paper is based was conducted in March 2013 in Catalonia 
(Spain) during the primary school pre-registration period. We obtained the corporate 
electronic mail of all Catalan schools from the Catalan Regional Educational Authority. In 
our experiment we only considered private schools.12 We did this because the admission of 
children in public schools is not discretionary and children residing in a given district are 
automatically assigned to the public school closest to their home address. This left us with 
a total of 610 schools in the study.  
 
Our experiment consisted of contacting schools by email and requesting an interview or a 
visit to the school. We resorted to an internet field experiment because we are interested in 
studying the non-influenced behavior of the participants, a factor that is only possible if 
participants do not know ex-ante that they are participating in the study. This methodology 
also allowed us to not only contact all the schools with a remarkably low level of effort and 
time, but it also made feedback from the schools easier.  
 
We created three fictitious couples: one heterosexual, one male homosexual and one female 
homosexual. Since the experiment was conducted on the internet, for each type of couple 
we simply needed to create an email address and names for the fictitious applicants and 
their respective daughters to which the schools could respond. We choose a daughter 
instead of randomly assigning a son or a daughter to minimize experiment costs and also 
because of the inexistence of schools that segregate by gender. We also thought that there 
was no reason to assume that schools would change their behavior dependent on the gender 
of the child. Choosing a name for the corresponding applicants was an important part of 
this field experiment. In order to avoid any undesirable bias that might emerge as a result 
of ethnic origin, we randomly assigned a common Spanish name to each couple and their 
corresponding daughter.13 These are typical Spanish names, which are also gender unique.  
The next step was to create and assign an email address to each fictitious couple. We decided 
                                                          
12 Among these private schools we can divide the sample into schools receiving public funding (concertadas) and 
schools without public funding. 
13 Names were randomly selected from the ten most common Spanish names, obtained from the Spanish Bureau of 
Statistics (INE). 
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to use the same email provider (Gmail) and the three email addresses had the following 
structure: name.surname.number@gmail.com.  
 
In order to test both male and female sexual orientation discrimination, each school 
received two emails: one from a heterosexual couple and the other from a gay or lesbian 
couple. In order to avoid any bias, emails from gay or lesbian couples accompanying the 
emails from the heterosexual couples where assigned randomly to half of the schools. 
Although proceeding in this way meant that we lost half of the sample for each type of 
homosexual couple, we gained experimental credibility and stringency. We thought that 
schools might be suspicious if they received emails from all three (gay-lesbian-hetero). The 
order in which each e-mail was sent (heterosexual-homosexual or homosexual-
heterosexual) was also randomized. The emails were sent to each school over a three-day 
period. 
 
We designed templates for the three emails to be sent. We generated three different emails 
where the sexual orientation of the couple was made explicit. Thus, all emails had the 
following structure: a heading with a greeting from both members of the couple, a comment 
pointing out that the child belongs to both parents and that they were interested in enrolling 
the child in that school, a request for an appointment to have an interview and visit to the 
school. Finally, a closing statement was included signed by both members of the couple. The 
sexual orientation of the couple was made explicit by combining male/female, male/male 
and female/female names in the closing section of the email. All three emails had different 
content but were written in a way that did not reveal further information that might have 
influenced the probability of a response. An example is the following:  
 
Hello, 
We are XXX and YYY and we are looking for a school for 
our 5 year old daughter ZZZ. She begins the first grade in 
the next academic year. We are considering this school 
as an option. Would it be possible for us to meet and visit 
the school? 
Sincerely, 
XXX and YYY 
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In order to avoid gender bias, for schools receiving an email from the male homosexual and 
heterosexual couples, both emails were signed first by a man. On the other hand, for schools 
receiving emails from female homosexual and heterosexual couples, both emails were 
signed by a woman. In order to avoid any undesired problem for schools, any invitation 
received was rapidly declined. When the pre-registration period concluded we processed all 
the responses and created a database with all the potential outcomes (response and 
invitations from schools), information regarding schools (private/semi-private, 
laic/catholic and city size), and information regarding the person signing the response 
(gender and school position). 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
In Table 1 we show the distribution of email replies. Twenty-four percent of the schools that 
received hetero/gay paired emails did not reply to any of the two fictitious couples, whereas 
this was 30% for the lesbian/hetero paired emails. However, 36% and 42% replied to both 
fictitious couples in both pairs of emails, respectively. The difference between the 
proportions of schools that replied to only heterosexual couples and only male homosexual 
couples was 22.3% (31.1% vs. 8.9%), whilst this difference for the case of hetero/lesbian 
couples was 3.3% (15.6% vs. 12.3%). 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of responses/invitations and the test of differences in 
proportions for these variables between male homosexual and heterosexual couples. In 
order to obtain a variable “response”, we do not distinguish whether the response is positive 
or negative. We found that those schools that received emails from heterosexual and male 
homosexual couples (305), seemed to be more hesitant to have correspondence with male 
homosexual than with heterosexual couples, 67.2% vs. 44.9%. The difference of 22.3% in 
the response rate was statistically significant at any significance level. The results regarding 
invitations to parents to visit the school were similar. 63.9% of the heterosexual couples 
received an invitation, whilst the figure for male homosexual couples was 42.2%. The gap 
in the invitation rate (21.7%) was again statistically significant at any significant level. 
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         Table 1: Distribution of responded emails 
 
Paired emails 
Gay/Hetero 
Paired emails 
Lesbian/Hetero 
# of schools 305 301 
Neither replied 73 90 
 23.9% 29.9% 
Both replied 110 127 
 36.1% 42.2% 
Replied only heterosexual 95 47 
 31.1% 15.6% 
Replied only homosexual 27 37 
 8.9% 12.3% 
Both replied (first email sent 
hetero) 
75 57 
 24.6% 18.9% 
Replied only heterosexual (first 
email sent hetero) 
24 15 
 7.9% 5.0% 
Replied only homosexual (first 
email sent hetero) 
24 32 
 7.9% 10.6% 
 
 
Table 2: Response rates and invitations to visit the school 
heterosexual vs. male homosexual parents 
Variable Sample 
size 
Heterosexual Men 
Homosexual 
Diff. p - 
value 
Response 305 67.2% (205) 44.9% (137) 22.3% 0.0001 
Invitation 305 63.9% (195) 42.2% (129) 21.7% 0.0002 
Notes: Number of e-mails within parentheses. 
 
 
Table 3: Response rates and invitations to visit the school heterosexual 
vs. female homosexual parents 
Variable Sample 
size 
Heterosexual Women 
Homosexual 
Diff p - 
value 
Response 301 57.8% (174) 54.4% (164) 3.4% 0.1380 
Invitation 301 55.1% (166) 51.8% (156) 3.3% 0.1321 
Notes: Number of e-mails within parentheses. 
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In Table 3 we show the results of the same analysis but here we compared the feedback of 
schools to heterosexual and female homosexual couples. In this case, we did not observe 
statistically significant differences in either the response rate or the invitation rate, 
although in both variables there was a positive gap in favour of heterosexual couples, 3.4% 
(57.87% vs. 54.4%) and 3.3% (55.1% vs. 51.8%), respectively.  
 
Other variables, which will be used as independent variables in the econometric analysis, 
are described and summarized in Table 4. For the sample of schools receiving emails from 
heterosexual and male homosexual couples, about 66.5% of schools were religious 
(catholic) and about 96% semi-private. The sample of schools receiving emails from 
heterosexual and female homosexual couples had similar characteristics. About 62.7% of 
schools are religious (catholic) and 94% are semi-private. Therefore, it is worth noting that 
the majority of the schools in the sample are semi-private and more than a half are 
religious institutions. Around 28% of the schools are located in Barcelona city.  
 
From most of the email responses we were able to ascertain who had responded. This 
allowed us to create two variables denoting the gender and the administrative position of 
the respondent (principal or secretary). In Table 5 we report the distribution of 
gender/position of the email respondent and the test of differences in proportions for 
these variables between male homosexual and heterosexual couples. The responses from 
schools that received the hetero-gay paired emails did not reveal any statistically 
significant differences according to the gender and position of the respondent between 
emails responded to gay and hetero couples. Results regarding responses from schools 
that received the hetero-lesbian paired emails are qualitatively the same as the ones sent 
to the hetero-gay paired emails (see Table 6).  
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Table 4: Explanatory variables used in econometric analysis 
Independent 
variables 
Description Hetero and Men 
Homo 
Hetero and 
Women Homo 
  Mean Sd Mean Sd 
      
Religious 1 If the school depends on a 
religious institution 
0.665 
(203) 
0.472 0.627 
(189) 
0.484 
      
Non-religious 1 If the school not depends on 
a religious institution 
0.334 
(102) 
0.472 0.372  
(112) 
0.484 
      
Semi-private 1 If it is a private schools 
receiving public funds 
0.960 
(293) 
0.194 0.940 
(283) 
0.237 
      
Private 1 If it is a private schools not 
receiving public funds 
0.039 
(12) 
0.194 0.059  
(18) 
0.237 
      
Less 10.000 1 if the school is located in an 
area of less than 10.000 
inhabitants  
0.111 
(34) 
0.314 0.086 
(26) 
0.281 
      
10.000 to 50.000 1 if the school is located in an 
area from 10.000 to 50.000 
inhabitants 
0.232 
(71) 
0.422 0.235 
 (71) 
0.424 
      
 50.000 to 100.000 1 if the school is located in an 
area from 50.000 to 100.000 
inhabitants 
0.134 
(41) 
0.341 0.1362 
(41) 
0.343 
      
More than 100.000 
excluding Barcelona 
1 if the school is located in an 
area of more than 100.000 
inhabitants 
0.242 
(74) 
0.429 0.2425 
(73) 
0.428 
      
Barcelona city 1 if the school is located in 
Barcelona 
0.278 
(85) 
0.448 0.2990 
(90) 
0.458 
      
Number of schools  305 301 
Notes: Number of e-mails within parenthese
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            Table 5: Summary statistics for the respondent of the email (pairs hetero – gay) 
 Hetero  Gay    
 Mean std  Mean std  Diff t-stat 
Secretary 0.278 0.448  0.226 0.418  0.052 1.073 
 (57)   (31)     
Principal 0.400 0.490  0.387 0.487  0.013 0.244 
 (82)   (53)     
Unknown position 0.322 0.467  0.387 0.487  -0.065 -1.235 
 (66)   (53)     
Male 0.176 0.380  0.139 0.346  0.037 0.911 
 (36)   (19)     
Female  0.532 0.499  0.547 0.498  -0.016 -0.286 
 (109)   (75)     
Unknown gender 0.293 0.455  0.314 0.464  -0.021 -0.418 
 (60)   (43)     
N 205   137     
Notes: Number of e-mails within parentheses. 
             
 
 
            Table 6: Summary statistics for the respondent of the email (pairs hetero – lesbian) 
 Hetero  Gay    
 Mean std  Mean std  Diff t-stat 
Secretary 0.287 0.453 0.293 0.455 -0.005 -0.108 
 (50)   (48)     
Principal 0.431 0.495 0.415 0.493 0.016 0.305 
 (75)   (68)     
Unknown position 0.282 0.450 0.293 0.455 -0.011 -0.225 
 (49)   (48)     
Male 0.236 0.424 0.220 0.414 0.016 0.353 
 (41)   (36)     
Female  0.569 0.495 0.610 0.488 -0.041 -0.762 
 (99)   (100)     
Unknown gender 0.195 0.397 0.171 0.376 0.025 0.586 
 (34)   (28)     
N 174   164     
Notes: Number of e-mails within parentheses. 
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5.2. Econometric analysis  
 
In Table 7 we show the results of the estimates of the probability of receiving a response 
(columns 1 and 2) and an invitation (columns 3 and 4), but here we controlled for the 
type of school (private or semi-private), religious orientation (catholic or lay), and the 
school’s location (city size). To estimate the determinants of these probabilities we 
resorted to the probit model. In order to facilitate interpretation we reported estimated 
marginal effects instead of estimated coefficients. The results underline the findings 
already established in the previous descriptive analysis. After controlling for the set of 
covariates regarding school characteristics, we observed that for male homosexual 
couples the probability of a response was 22.5 percentage points lower than for 
heterosexual couples (column 1). Results regarding the probability of receiving an 
invitation (column 2) are practically identical. For male homosexual couples the 
probability of receiving an invitation is 22 percentage points lower than for heterosexual 
couples. In both cases the estimated marginal effects are statistically significant at any 
significant level.  
 
When we compared female homosexual with heterosexual couples, we observed that the 
probability of a response (column 3) and the probability of receiving an invitation 
(column 4) were 3.4 percentage points lower for the former than for the latter group. 
However, in both cases estimated marginal effects were not statistically significant. We 
also observed that none of the covariates that picked up school characteristics 
(catholic/laic, private/semi-private and city size) are statistically significant in any of the 
alternative models. Only three of the city size dummies have turned out to be statistically 
significant at 10 percent significance level (column 1 and 3), but any regular pattern can 
be inferred from this results. Although it is not shown in the results, we also estimated 
alternative models that included interactions between the homosexual status of the 
parents and the characteristics of the schools. However, none of these interactions 
provided a statistically significant effect. 
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Table 7: Probit analysis on the determinants of the probability of response and invitation from 
schools. 
 
Men Homosexual vs. 
Heterosexual   
Women Homosexual vs. 
Heterosexual 
 (1)   (2) 
 Response Invitation  Response Invitation  
Homosexual -0.2254*** -0.2203***   -0.0340 -0.0337  
 0.0393 0.0397   0.0405 0.0407  
Religious 0.0511 0.0486   0.0164 0.0190  
 0.0457 0.0459   0.0440 0.0441  
Semi-private 0.0955 0.1464   0.0905 0.0681  
 0.1108 0.1087   0.0907 0.0907  
Population  
(Base Barcelona)        
Less 10.000 0.1119 0.1260   -0.1340* -0.0749  
 0.0680 0.0692   0.0797 0.0802  
        
10.000 to 50.000 0.0951* 0.1349   -0.0610 0.0019  
 0.0561 0.0562   0.0565 0.0562  
        
50.000 to 100.000 0.0237 0.0165   -0.0204 0.0413  
 0.0669 0.0679   0.0673 0.0665  
        
More than 100.000  0.1177** 0.1222   -0.1326 -0.1032  
 0.0555 0.0564   0.0560 0.0559  
        
Observations 610 610    602 602  
 
 
We also ran a probit regression with the sample of responded emails. This analysis was 
intended to explore whether the respondent’s gender and his/her administrative position 
(principal or secretary) was a determinant in the probability of responding to gay or 
lesbian vs. heterosexual couples. In this regression we also controlled for the 
characteristics of the schools. As already shown in Tables 5 and 6, we observed that 
neither the characteristics of the school nor the characteristics of the respondent were 
significant in determining this probability. 
 
Thus far, our econometric results regarding how schools interact with parents according 
to their sexual orientation have supported most of the previous evidence regarding 
discrimination against homosexual individuals in other contexts: wage differentials (e.g. 
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Plug and Berkhout 2004; Ahmed and Hammarstedt 2010) or housing markets (e.g. 
Ahmed and Hammarstedt 2008a, Ahmed et al. 2008b). These studies also found 
evidence of discrimination against male homosexuals but not against female 
homosexuals. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we test for the first time whether schools are more hesitant to conduct 
feedback with homosexual rather than with heterosexual parents. In order to do so we 
used an internet field experiment with schools during the children’s pre-registration 
period in Catalonia (Spain). We observed that male homosexual parents are 22.5 
percentage points less likely to receive an answer from schools than heterosexual 
couples. However, differences in the response rate from schools to female homosexual 
and heterosexual couples were not statistically significant. This evidence coincides with 
the finding from previous studies that have analyzed the existence of discrimination 
against homosexuals in other fields. Of course, we cannot be sure that if we had formally 
applied for the admission of the children of our fictitious homosexual parents to these 
schools, their applications would be turned down in the same proportion that we 
estimate here. However, it seems to us that the fact that schools are more hesitant to 
interact with gay couples than with heterosexual couples is indicative that some kind of 
subtle discrimination from schools or school principals against male homosexual couples 
may exist. However, this result, combined with the fact that we did not find significant 
differences between heterosexual and female homosexual couples, suggests that male 
homosexual couples might be penalized not only because of their sexual orientation but 
also because of the lack of a maternal figure. This, nevertheless, is a form of 
discrimination. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Efficiency vs. equity in 
education: What do citizens 
value most? 
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1- Introduction 
The objectives of any welfare state policy are usually twofold, and comprise the efficient 
allocation and equitable distribution of resources. The extent to which these objectives 
should be pursued is a matter of political choice. A system is said to be efficient if a given 
output is obtained from a minimum input or a maximum output is obtained from a given 
input. The evaluation of efficiency deals with a comparison of benefits and costs. The 
concept of equity is vague, although there is a consensus among social scientists that 
equity relates closely to the equality of opportunity or universality of services (Roemer, 
1998). In public policy, there will be a trade-off between equity and efficiency. That is, 
under budget constraints, the implementation of a program aimed at universalizing a 
public service will be done at the expense of efficiency or vice versa. 
 
For instance, a social security program designed to reduce poverty may also reduce 
individuals’ incentives to work or to save, thereby creating inefficiency. A healthcare 
program designed to warn citizens about the dangers of smoking increases the average 
life expectancy of those who are more responsive to the message, leaving behind those 
who are less so, as a consequence increasing the gap between the two groups: in the end, 
this creates inequality. Finally, improving the equality of educational opportunities, and 
thus equity, could damage educational excellence, thereby reducing efficiency. 
 
As in any welfare state policy program, the goals of a state educational policy are usually 
focused on two sides. On the one hand there is the efficient allocation of resources and 
on the other hand there is the equitable distribution of these resources. There are several 
reasons to pursue both objectives, as inequalities and inefficiencies in education increase 
social costs in terms of lower income tax revenues, and raise issues such as health 
expenditure and public aid as well as crime rates and delinquency. In contrast, 
educational policies based on efficiency and equity create the possibility of maximizing 
long-term benefits, and reducing economic and social costs. This kind of initiative does 
incur costs, but the costs of inaction are higher. In this regard, the EU helps member 
states to promote the principles of efficiency and equity in their education system 
following the Lisbon Strategy and the Education and Training work program. 
 
Despite the clear benefits of promoting both efficient and equitable educational policies, 
both goals may not always be possible to achieve, as nowadays states are applying budget 
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reductions that directly affect the welfare state. Promoting educational policies incurs 
costs and during economic crisis periods governments and policymakers may have to 
choose between delivering efficient or equitable policies. In this context, a question 
arises. Is there a trade-off between efficiency and equity in terms of how citizens perceive 
public services? 
 
In this paper, we test to what extent citizens give more value to efficiency or equity in the 
provision of the educational service. To the best of our knowledge, the empirical 
literature analyzing how citizens value the implementation of public policies targeting 
the welfare state is virtually nonexistent.14 
 
To explore this issue, we resort to the European Social Survey (ESS), which is a biannual 
cross-national survey covering the period 2002–2012, using the six available waves. 
After controlling for a series of personal and country characteristics that may affect 
individual levels of satisfaction with the education system, our empirical results show 
that efficiency proxies have a positive impact on the level of citizens’ satisfaction with 
their respective national education system. However, the results regarding the effect of 
the equity variables are more ambiguous depending on whether we consider compulsory 
of post-compulsory education. 
 
With this aim, the remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
conceptual framework. Section 3 looks at the existing literature regarding efficiency and 
equity in education. In Section 4 we present the empirical framework. In Section 5 we 
describe the dataset. The results of the analysis are introduced in Section 6. And finally, 
Section 7 concludes and discusses some preliminary policy implications. 
 
2- Conceptual framework 
Since the variable used in this paper as a proxy for citizens’ assessment of their country’s 
education system is a satisfaction variable, this study can be framed within the literature 
regarding the determinants of subjective well-being. Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2002) give 
some clues about the determinants of an individual’s happiness and life satisfaction. 
Public institutions may have a remarkable influence on individuals’ life satisfaction and 
                                                          
14 Diaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose (2012, 2014) are two exceptions. 
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happiness. Therefore, the determinants presented by Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2002) may 
also be important as determinants of the citizens’ perception of public institutions. 
Indeed, Diaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose (2012, 2015) show that individual and 
country-level determinants of individuals’ happiness and life satisfaction are the same as 
individuals’ satisfaction with political institutions and with the educational and 
healthcare systems. 
 
As Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2002) point out, the determinants of subjective well-being 
can be grouped into three categories: first, those factors related to personal and 
demographic characteristics; second, micro- and macroeconomic factors that may 
influence the collective perception of an individual’s welfare; and finally, a third set of 
country characteristics based on the institutional or constitutional level. 
 
Using satisfaction with a specific individual or collective life domain (i.e., work 
satisfaction, satisfaction with the healthcare system, or satisfaction with the education 
system, among others) has an interesting feature. It allows us to observe the mediating 
effect of some variables that are closely related to a specific domain (i.e., education, 
health, democracy) in determining the impact on subjective well-being or satisfaction. 
Determining satisfaction with objects or experiences is straightforward; however, 
individuals may not only determine their satisfaction with a public institution based on 
their own personal experiences, but they may also use their experiences (family, friends) 
from their personal environment or the situation in their country. This is why we 
consider the third group of factors especially relevant; that is, constitutional and 
institutional factors, as mentioned in Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2002), that not only affect 
the individual, but also their personal environment. 
 
Generally, individuals will be satisfied if how they perceive their actual situation 
coincides with or is fairly close to their reference situation, while if there is a significant 
gap between these situations individuals will feel dissatisfied. When we analyze 
individuals’ satisfaction with objects or personal experiences, the comparison or 
reference situation may not be difficult to determine. For instance, if we are interested 
in analyzing job satisfaction or satisfaction with school grades, individuals may take work 
colleagues or schoolmates with similar characteristics as references. Thus, individuals 
may compare their salary, working conditions, or school grades with these comparable 
individuals. However, when we want to study the determinants of individuals’ 
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satisfaction with political institutions or public services at an aggregated level, whether 
that is national or subnational, the reference or comparison situation is more difficult to 
identify. Do individuals have some knowledge of, for instance, alternative education 
systems in other regions or countries that may lead them to be (un)satisfied with their 
own education system? 
 
Our hypothesis is that individuals might use aggregated information from other regions 
or countries in order to make an assessment of political institutions and public services 
such as education. For instance, rankings made up from national Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) scores, which are very visible in the media, 
might be taken by citizens as an indicator of the quality of their school system compared 
with the school system in other countries. Hence, citizens can make an assessment of 
how satisfied they feel with the education system in their country or region. 
 
3- Literature review 
Despite the fact that the economic literature evaluating the effect of educational policies 
or actions aimed at promoting efficiency or equity on students’ outcomes is quite 
abundant, the literature analyzing the assessment that citizens make of these policies is 
virtually non-existent. With regard to efficiency in early-childhood education, Fuchs and 
Woessmann (2004) show that preschool reading performance and kindergarten 
attendance had a positive effect on reading attainment at the end of primary education. 
Similar effects were found by Schuetz et al. (2005). They observed a positive correlation 
between the length of the preschool education system and science and mathematics 
performance in middle school. 
 
At the school level, some research shows that there is no clear relationship between 
resources spent on schools and student achievement (see Hanushek, 2003, for an 
overview, and Gundlach et al., 2001, for European evidence). For instance, Leuven et al. 
(2007) find that spending on computers to improve instruction methods is likely to be 
less effective than more traditional instruction methods at improving students’ 
performance. Results regarding the analysis of the relationship between class size and 
student performance is ambiguous. Some authors find no relationship between pupil 
spending or class size reductions and cognitive skills (Dobbelsteen et al., 2002). 
However, other authors (Ding and Lehrer, 2005, 2011), find that higher-ability students 
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receive benefits from class size reductions and no additional benefits for minority or 
disadvantaged students. On the contrary, Bosworth (2014) finds that students in the 
bottom of the achievement distribution appear to benefit more from class size reductions 
than the students at the top of the achievement distribution. The author finds that 
smaller classes also have lower achievement gaps on average, and that a class size 
reduction policy may be more effective in closing those gaps than raising average 
achievement. Rouse (2000), in a study conducted in the United States, finds small 
achievement gains in mathematics for African-American and Hispanic children 
attending voucher schools. 
 
Other authors show that school efficiency can be increased by institutional reforms such 
as accountability and school autonomy. Evidence suggests that the introduction of 
accountability through external tests leads to gains in educational performance (Betts, 
1998; Bishop, 1997, 2006). With regard to school autonomy, cross-country evidence 
shows that local decision-making (in aspects such as course contents, teachers’ salaries, 
and school budgets) combined with school accountability increases the efficiency of the 
education system (Wößmann, 2005a). In this regard, Diaz-Serrano and Meix-Llop 
(2015), using World Bank indicators and PISA data, show that in more fiscally 
decentralized countries students perform better. Therefore, if regional governments have 
the autonomy to spend and collect their own economic resources, their students perform 
better. Other public policies that could be assessed to increase school efficiency are 
economic incentives for teachers. Atkinson et al. (2004), in a paper conducted in 
England, found that monetary incentives for teachers had a positive impact on students’ 
achievement. Therefore, policies that set the right incentives for teachers, students, 
administrators, parents, and schools are able to increase the efficiency of the education 
system. From all this evidence, we conclude that students’ achievement is the most 
common proxy of efficiency. 
 
With respect to equity in early or preschool education, Schuetz et al. (2005) show that 
extensive education systems in terms of enrollment and duration improve this objective, 
as reflected by their lower dependence on the eighth-grade scores and the student’s 
family background. Therefore, early inclusive education programs with disadvantaged 
children seem to improve both equity and efficiency. Similarly to the efficiency aim, there 
is very little evidence suggesting that targeted spending on disadvantaged students is 
effective in increasing equity. In this vein, Leuven and Oosterbeek (2007), with quasi-
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experimental evidence from the Netherlands, show no positive or significant impact of 
interventions targeted at disadvantaged students, such as extra resources for computers, 
the introduction of qualified staff, or class size reductions. The only intervention that has 
a clear beneficial effect is lowering the compulsory school attendance age for students 
from disadvantaged families. 
 
The importance of training qualified teachers is also highlighted by the OECD (2005), 
since ensuring that all students have access to high-quality teachers will help to improve 
equity at the school level. However, Bonesrønning et al. (2005) show that an endogeneity 
problem can emerge, since better teachers may choose “good” schools; therefore, this 
positive link might be obscured, as problematic neighborhoods may have problems in 
attracting high-quality teachers. Another policy with an important impact on equity is 
the size of the preschool education system, however this effect is not clear. An extensive 
system of early-school education in terms of universal enrollment and duration seems a 
good option (see Schuetz et al., 2005) in order to achieve equality of educational 
opportunities at the school level. However, Diaz-Serrano and Pérez-Reynosa (2013) 
show that for children living in developing countries, one additional grade of primary 
education increases drop-outs in primary education and also has a negative impact on 
enrollment rates in secondary education. 
 
In the economics literature, the analysis of the trade-off between educational policies 
pursuing gains in efficiency and equity provides ambiguous results. Freeman et al. 
(2010), using the math scores from the Trends in International Mathematics and Science 
Study (TIMSS), underline the negative relation between cross-country variation in the 
level and dispersion of test scores. Thus, countries with the highest test scores are those 
with less inequality in their scores, suggesting what the authors call a “virtuous equity–
efficiency trade-off.” Bradley and Taylor (2004) suggest that competition has a positive 
effect on UK secondary school efficiency, without a significant effect on equity. On the 
other hand, Wößmann (2005b) shows a strong complementarity between efficiency and 
equity policies based on increasing public funding to private schools. 
 
4- Empirical framework 
In order to establish whether cross-country differences in efficiency or equity in 
education (key independent variables) have an impact on the level of citizens’ satisfaction 
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with their education system (our dependent variable), we follow the same empirical 
strategy as Diaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose (2012, 2015). We assume that an 
individual’s satisfaction with the education system in his/her country can be determined 
with the following linear relationship: 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑐 = ∝  + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑐 +  𝛾𝑍𝑐 +  𝜀𝑖𝑐 (1) 
 
where 𝑆𝑖𝑐 is the satisfaction of individual i with the education system in country c, 𝑋𝑖𝑐 is 
a matrix of variables characterizing citizen i living in country c, 𝑍𝑐 is a set of country 
characteristics including our variables of interest, which are the same for all the citizens 
living in the same country, and finally 𝜀𝑖𝑐 is the random error term and 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾 are a 
set of parameters to be estimated. In order to provide our data with a temporal 
dimension, we pool all available waves of the ESS. We proceed in this way, since we 
consider that an institutional or economic shock in a country at a given period of time 
may cause a variation in the outcome variable that cannot otherwise be captured. This is 
especially important in our case, as our outcome variable is a satisfaction measure. As we 
mentioned in Section 2, individuals may be highly influenced by their country’s 
environment in the development of their self-satisfaction. This shock may remain 
unobservable and bias the estimated effects of the country-level variables on the 
outcome; that is, a statistically significant effect may turn out to be non-significant. 
Taking this temporal dimension into account allows us to control these changes in 
individuals’ satisfaction and smooth out the potential bias on the estimated parameters. 
 
Considering the temporal dimension in the model implies the introduction of not only 
specific country effects, but also specific time effects, as the efficiency and equity 
variables vary by country and year. We thus consider that the propensity of individual i 
residing in country c to report a specific level of satisfaction with the state of the 
education system in period t is determined by the following linear relationship: 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑡 = ∝  + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 +  𝛾𝑍𝑐𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜆𝑐 +  𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡  (2) 
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where 𝛿𝑡 are time effects included as dummy variables in order to control for any 
unobserved temporal shock that could affect our response variable, and 𝜆𝑐 allow us to 
control for any unobserved country shocks. 
 
In Equation (2), we do not observe 𝑆𝑖
∗ but instead an indicator variable of the type  
𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝑗 if 𝜇𝑗−1 <  𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑡
∗  ≤  𝜇𝑗  (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽). Given the ordinal nature of the outcome 
variable, one option to estimate Equation (2) is a pooled ordinal probit model. However, 
with big sample sizes, non-linear models with random effects are highly computationally 
demanding. In addition, in an 11-point ordinal scale, we estimate ten marginal effects per 
variable, which makes the analysis a bit tedious. This can be addressed by moving to a 
linear framework. Moving to a linear framework also facilitates the interpretation of the 
estimated effects, as it provides only one marginal effect per variable. Van Praag and 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) suggest the use of probit ordinary least squares (POLS).15 This 
approach enables the use of simple linear ordinary least squares (OLS), instead of ordinal 
probit methods, without any loss of efficiency. 
 
As our dataset is a pool of independent cross sections by country in order to take into 
account the specific country effects 𝜆𝑐, Equation (2) can be estimated resorting to either 
a random- or fixed-effects model. The choice between the two models will crucially 
depend on the correlation of 𝜆𝑐 with 𝑍𝑐𝑡 and 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡. If this correlation is significantly 
different from zero, the random-effects model will provide inconsistent estimates of the 
set of parameters 𝛽 and 𝛾; therefore, a fixed-effects model offers a more suitable 
framework. However, if these correlations are not significantly different from zero, then 
the random-effects estimator provides consistent estimates of the parameters in 
Equation (2). 
 
5- Data 
The data used in this study are primarily drawn from the ESS. The ESS is an academically 
driven cross-national survey that was conducted every two years, starting in 2002. The 
survey compiles microdata from citizens of 36 European countries measuring their 
attitudes, beliefs, and behavior patterns in fields such as politics and social or work 
                                                          
15 The POLS involves the transformation of the observed ordinal outcome 𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝑗 as ln(𝑍𝑖𝑐𝑡) =
[𝜙(𝜇𝑗−1,𝑡) − 𝜙(𝜇𝑗,𝑡)]/[Φ(𝜇𝑗,𝑡) − Φ(𝜇𝑗−1,𝑡)], where 𝜙(∘) and Φ(∘) are the normal density function and the 
cumulative normal distribution, respectively. 
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environments, among others. The aims of this survey include tracking how European 
citizens’ conditions and attitudes are changing on topics such as moral, political, and 
social issues in order to help social science researchers with comparative quantitative 
analysis and also to improve the visibility of the data on social changes among 
researchers, policymakers, and the wider public. 
 
We resort to this survey because of its easy management and because its wide scope 
allows us to characterize individuals in some key aspects, such as their beliefs, job status, 
educational level, and family situation. We take advantage of some ESS variables such as 
the age of the respondent, their educational level, citizenship, self-reported health,16 
ideology,17 the number of people living in this household, and job status in order to 
improve the accuracy of the estimation. 
 
5.1- Dependent variable (𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑡) 
Our outcome variable is the citizens’ satisfaction with their country’s education system, 
taken from the ESS. To the question “Please say what you think overall about the state of 
education in your country nowadays,” those surveyed individuals had to express their 
satisfaction on a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 being the lowest level of satisfaction and 10 the 
highest. Table 1 show the average satisfaction with the education system disaggregated 
by country. The countries where the citizens are most satisfied with their education 
system are Finland, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and Belgium, while the least satisfied 
are Greece, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, and Italy. Table 2 shows the 
summary statistics for the dependent variable. The average satisfaction of the pool of 
countries is above 5, and the standard deviation is 2.3, which confirms the notable 
dispersion among countries observed in Table 1. 
 
5.2- Explanatory variables I: Individual controls (𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡) 
The individual variables used in this analysis are the same as in Diaz-Serrano and 
Rodríguez-Pose (2015). From the ESS we use the following individual controls: the age 
of the respondent, educational level, citizenship, self-reported health,18 political 
                                                          
16 Self-reported health is measured on a 1 to 5 scale, with 1 being “very good” and 5 “very bad.” 
17 Individual ideology is measured on a 0 to 10 scale with 0 being “left” and 10 “right.” 
18 Self-reported health is measured on a 1 to 5 scale, with 1 being “very good” and 5 “very bad.” 
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ideology19 of the individual, the number of people living in the household, and job status. 
In Table 2 the summary statistics for this set of variables is presented. We observe that 
the average age is 47. With regard to the education of individuals, 16% of the sample are 
educated to below lower-secondary level, 19% have only completed lower-secondary 
education, 35% completed upper-secondary education, and 24% of the sample 
completed tertiary education. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for satisfaction variable, values are estimated from individual responses and 
averaged by country 
 Satisfaction with the educational system 
 mean s.d. rank 
Belgium 6.04 2.29 5 
Bulgaria 4.53 2.66 20 
Croatia 5.16 2.17 15 
Denmark 7.03 2.03 2 
Estonia 5.45 2.28 10 
Finland 7.49 1.71 1 
France 5.19 2.20 14 
Greece 3.99 2.43 23 
Hungary 4.96 2.37 17 
Ireland 6.38 2.17 3 
Israel 4.88 2.60 18 
Italy 4.66 2.09 19 
Netherlands 5.79 1.78 6 
Norway 6.25 1.90 4 
Poland 5.30 2.28 13 
Portugal 4.17 2.12 22 
Russian Federation 4.34 2.43 21 
Slovak Republic 5.34 2.26 12 
Slovenia 5.40 2.27 11 
Spain 5.72 2.25 7 
Sweden 5.56 2.06 8 
Switzerland 6.25 2.08 4 
Turkey 5.08 3.09 16 
United Kingdom 5.46 2.21 9 
 
                                                          
19 Individual ideology is measured on a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 being “left” and 10 “right.” 
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In terms of nationality, 96% of the sample have the citizenship of the country where they 
have been interviewed. The average level of individuals’ self-reported health is 2.20 and 
on average they have 2.8 people living in their household. The summary statistics also 
highlight that the political ideology of the ESS respondents is slightly oriented to the 
right, as the mean value is 5.18 (here we have to consider that a centered ideology is 5). 
In terms of individuals’ job status, 23.2% of the sample are retired, 48% have a paid job, 
8% are students, 2% are disabled, 0.1% are in military service, 9% are homeworkers, and 
6% are unemployed. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for the variables used in the econometric analysis 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Satisfaction with educational system 211.931 5.5475 2.3846 0 10 
Age 223.251 47.5540 18.6265 13 91 
 
Less than low-secondary education 223.074 0.1630 0.3693 0 1 
Low secondary education 223.074 0.1979 0.3984 0 1 
Upper secondary education 223.074 0.3546 0.4784 0 1 
Post-secondary education 223.074 0.0354 0.1847 0 1 
Tertiary 223.074 0.2486 0.4322 0 1 
Citizenship 223.986 0.9598 0.1965 0 1 
Self-reported health 223.903 2.2091 0.9338 1 5 
Left-right political scale 191.801 5.1893 2.2183 0 10 
People living in household 223.929 2.8284 1.5097 1 24 
Retired 222.981 0.2320 0.4221 0 1 
Paid work 222.981 0.4840 0.4997 0 1 
Student 222.981 0.0861 0.2806 0 1 
Disabled 222.981 0.0249 0.1557 0 1 
Military service 222.981 0.0017 0.0417 0 1 
Homework 222.981 0.0996 0.2995 0 1 
Unemployed 222.981 0.0600 0.2375 0 1 
GDP pc current 2005 224.169 31546.58 18598.77 2030.78 99635.88 
Expenditure in education as percentage of GDP 179.893 5.48 1.05 2.4002 8.4376 
Unemployment rate 224.169 8.21 3.96 2.6 25.2 
Math score 216.848 493.01 28.42 413.44 548.35 
Reading score 216.848 491.96 23.67 401.93 546.86 
Science score 216.848 497.67 25.70 423.83 563.32 
Gross enrollment rate primary 212.763 102.70 4.53 92.37 117.22 
Gross enrollment rate secondary 193.273 105.87 12.14 82.95 155.98 
Gross enrollment rate tertiary 184.958 64.00 12.60 26.19 95.017 
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5.3- Explanatory variables II: Country variables (𝑍𝑐𝑡) 
Our variables of interest, which are the proxies for efficiency and equity, are measured at 
a country level. In order to assess the impact of the efficiency in education on the citizens’ 
perception of the education system, we resort to the PISA database. The PISA report is 
an international standardized study that provides academic results in the areas of 
mathematics, science, and reading; we use these three scores as a proxy of efficiency in 
education. As we show in Section 3, different student assessment tests (PISA, the 
National Assessment of Educational Progress [NAEP], or TIMSS, among others) are 
usually used as a proxy of efficiency in the educational environment. We chose the PISA 
data for its easy management and its wide country coverage. Since some of the waves of 
the PISA report differ in time from the ESS waves, we assigned the PISA scores to the 
corresponding ESS wave as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Matching of PISA years with ESS waves  
ESS Wave ESS Year PISA Year 
1 2002 2000 
2 2004 2003 
3 2006 2006 
4 2008 2009 
 5 2010 2009 
6 2012 2012 
 
The first wave of the PISA was conducted in 2000; we assigned the students’ 
achievement results to the corresponding country of the first wave of the ESS, which was 
conducted in 2002. The PISA 2003 results were matched with the 2004 ESS data; for 
the year 2006 both PISA and ESS coincide. The 2008 and 2010 waves of the ESS were 
both assigned with the PISA scores from 2009, and finally, for the year 2012, ESS and 
PISA coincide. The PISA report, in addition to the microdata, also provides the country 
score, and we use this in our analysis. Since students work on different test booklets, 
scores must be scaled to allow valid comparisons. This scaling is done using the Rasch 
model on item response theory; this method is widely used in other academic 
achievement reports such as TIMSS and NAEP. We consider country PISA scores to be a 
suitable measure of efficiency, as they precisely measure the country’s students’ 
achievement in three different topics and they are widely used in economics research. 
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Our equity proxy variables are taken from the World Bank data. We use the gross 
enrollment rates in primary, secondary, and tertiary education as equity indicators. The 
gross enrollment rate is calculated as the ratio between the number of individuals who 
are actually enrolled in a certain grade (regardless of age) divided by the population of 
the age group that officially corresponds to the same level. This value can exceed 100 
because it includes those students that are older than the age at which one individual 
would usually achieve a given grade. The measure differs from the net enrollment rate, 
as this is the number of the enrolled population in a certain grade that belongs to the age 
group that officially corresponds to that grade divided by the total population of the same 
age group. As our purpose is to measure equity or universality, we think that the gross 
enrollment rate is a better measure, as it captures all students enrolled in a grade, not 
only those who correspond to their age. The gross enrollment rate in primary education 
considers individuals between the ages of 6 and 11, the gross enrollment rate in secondary 
education considers individuals between 12 and 17 years old, and the gross enrollment 
rate in tertiary education considers the group of individuals at the age of leaving 
secondary school, which is 18. We matched each equity variable by year with the 
corresponding ESS wave. 
 
Table 4: Equity and efficiency measures 
and its source 
 
Variable Source 
Mathematics score OECD PISA Report 
Reading score OECD PISA Report 
Science score OECD PISA Report 
Gross enrollment rate at primary World Bank Data, Education 
statistics 
Gross enrollment rate at secondary World Bank Data, Education 
statistics 
Gross enrollment rate at tertiary World Bank Data, Education 
statistics 
 
Because not all efficiency and equity variables were available for all ESS countries, we 
had to restrict the sample to 24 countries.20  
 
As the present study is based on the educational framework, we consider it appropriate 
to include the government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP. We also 
consider the unemployment rate, as it can be an important factor in determining citizens’ 
                                                          
20 Countries included in the analysis: Portugal, the Netherlands, France, the UK, Spain, Ireland, Israel, 
Turkey, Belgium, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Greece, Hungary, 
Norway, Finland, Estonia, Slovenia, Poland, the Russian Federation, and Croatia. 
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perception of the education system. Finally, we include the logarithm of the GDP per 
capita at 2005 prices as an indicator of the state of the country’s economy. All these 
country variables are matched with the ESS, not only taking into consideration the 
spatial, but also the appropriate time horizon. In Table 2, the summary statistics for the 
country control variables are presented. We see that countries on average spend 5.4% of 
their GDP on education, they have an average unemployment rate of 8.2%, and their 
average GDP is 31,546,58. 
 
As we noted, our key independent variables are the equity and efficiency indicators. On 
the one hand, we have the efficiency variables. As we stated above, we use the PISA 
country scores in mathematics, science and reading as efficiency proxies. In Table 2, we 
see that the aggregate country mean for the PISA mathematics score is 493, while it is 
491 for reading and 497 for science. Table 5 reflects heterogeneity scores among 
countries. For instance, we see that the top three performing countries in mathematics 
are Finland, Switzerland and the Netherlands while the worst results are obtained by 
Israel, Turkey and Bulgaria. In terms of the reading scores, the top three performers are 
Finland, Ireland, and the Netherlands and those that obtain the worst scores are the 
Russian Federation, Turkey, and Bulgaria. Finally, with regard to the results for science 
achievement, Finland, Estonia, and the Netherlands are in the top three positions, while 
Israel, Bulgaria, and Turkey are last. We note that both Finland and the Netherlands are 
in the top three for all achievements, while Bulgaria is consistently in the last three. 
 
In Table 2 we show a summary of the statistics on the equity variables. The aggregated 
country mean for the gross enrollment rates is 102.7%, 105.8%, and 64.0% in primary, 
secondary, and tertiary education, respectively. Table 6 presents the average score at the 
country level. It can be seen that the three countries with the highest rate in primary 
education are Portugal, the Netherlands, and France, while the three with the lowest ones 
are Poland, the Russian Federation, and Croatia. With regard to the gross enrollment 
rate in secondary education, we see on the one hand that Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Spain have the highest rates, and on the other that Bulgaria, Turkey, and the Russian 
Federation have the lowest. Finally, in tertiary education, Finland, Slovenia, and Sweden 
have the highest rates, while the Slovak Republic, Switzerland, and Turkey have the 
lowest. 
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Table 5: Time averaged efficiency variables by country 
 Math score Reading score Science score 
 Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Belgium 518.96 4 506.04 5 505.36 8 
Bulgaria 427.47 24 425.44 24 439.75 24 
Croatia 459.94 20 475.75 19 486.37 18 
Denmark 507.20 6 495.05 12 492.31 14 
Estonia 514.98 5 505.14 6 532.36 2 
Finland 537.56 1 538.34 1 550.27 1 
France 500.92 10 497.75 11 500.18 12 
Greece 455.85 21 477.82 18 470.29 21 
Hungary 488.70 15 486.63 14 500.96 11 
Ireland 496.93 11 511.77 2 510.55 7 
Israel 446.55 22 470.02 21 451.81 22 
Italy 472.18 18 484.78 15 487.39 17 
Netherlands 528.69 3 509.59 3 523.17 3 
Norway 495.15 13 499.77 9 494.14 13 
Poland 493.21 14 499.86 8 502.94 9 
Portugal 474.96 17 481.31 16 480.08 19 
Russian Federation 470.36 19 453.09 23 478.68 20 
Slovak Rep. 495.84 12 472.82 20 490.80 15 
Slovenia 502.53 7 487.09 13 514.26 5 
Spain 482.23 16 480.73 17 490.02 16 
Sweden 502.50 8 507.18 4 502.86 10 
Switzerland 530.40 2 499.72 10 510.73 6 
Turkey 435.88 23 454.11 22 445.36 23 
U.K. 500.94 9 501.41 7 517.38 4 
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Table 6: Time averaged equity variables by country 
 Gross enrolment  
primary 
Gross enrolment 
secondary 
Gross enrolment 
tertiary 
 Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Belgium 103.03 9 117.28 4 62.55 11 
Bulgaria 101.14 12 90.72 22 52.74 21 
Croatia 92.72 24 97.98 16 53.32 20 
Denmark 100.70 15 121.41 1 73.29 6 
Estonia 99.58 18 105.42 10 68.77 9 
Finland 99.28 20 113.48 6 91.41 1 
France 106.40 3 108.85 9 54.13 19 
Greece 101.09 13 102.34 18 73.22 7 
Hungary 99.95 17 97.78 17 59.14 15 
Ireland 104.17 6 112.59 7 59.92 12 
Israel 104.15 7 103.63 11 58.25 18 
Italy 100.96 14 98.61 15 58.45 17 
Netherlands 107.25 2 120.58 2 59.23 14 
Norway 99.35 19 113.53 5 75.15 4 
Poland 98.17 22 98.78 14 66.58 10 
Portugal 114.47 1 102.47 12 58.69 16 
Russian Federation 96.03 23 83.14 24 73.97 5 
Slovak Rep. 101.98 11 92.61 21 48.06 22 
Slovenia 98.59 21 97.16 19 78.92 2 
Spain 104.61 5 120.45 3 69.25 8 
Sweden 100.39 16 111.02 8 77.00 3 
Switzerland 102.83 10 94.85 20 46.46 23 
Turkey 103.64 8 87.38 23 35.86 24 
U.K. 105.69 4 102.25 13 59.52 13 
 
 
In Graphics 1 to 6, we plot the satisfaction with the education system vs. the efficiency 
(Graphics 1, 2, and 3) and equity proxies (Graphics 4, 5, and 6). In Graphics 1, 2, and 3 
we see a strong positive linear correlation between individuals’ satisfaction with their 
education system and the average PISA country scores for each country. Thus, the top 
PISA performers are also countries where their citizens are more satisfied with their 
education system. In Graphics 5 and 6, we observe a strong positive linear correlation 
between the gross enrollment rates in secondary and tertiary education and the 
satisfaction with the education system. However, in Graphic 4 this correlation is less 
clear. 
 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
THREE ESSAYS ON EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 
Enric Meix Llop 
 
77 
 
Graphic 1: Satisfaction with the educational system and math scores by country 
 
Graphic 2: Satisfaction with the educational system and reading scores by country 
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Graphic 3: Satisfaction with the educational system and science scores by country 
 
Graphic 4: Satisfaction with the educational system and gross enrolment rates at primary by country 
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Graphic 5: Satisfaction with the educational system and gross enrolment rates at secondary by country 
 
Graphic 6: Satisfaction with the educational system and gross enrolment rates at tertiary by country 
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6- Econometric results 
In Table 7 we report he estimates of Equation (2). As we noted in Section 4, our model 
can be estimated with random- or with fixed-effects regressions. In order to make a 
choice between these two approaches, we first run the fixed-effects regressions and check 
whether correlations between the country-specific-effects and the covariates are high. 
We obtained low correlations, around 0.09, which indicates that the random effects 
model may be suitable for our purposes. Second, to confirm that a random-effects model 
is appropriate, we conducted the Hausman specification test. In this test we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis, which indicates that the random effects model will provide 
consistent estimates of the parameters in Equation (2). 
 
6.1- The effect of individual factors 
Estimated coefficients for the individual variables are shown at the top of Table 7. Since 
all models are based on Equation (2), by simply varying the corresponding efficiency or 
equity indicator all coefficients are very similar across the board in terms of magnitude, 
sign, and significance. Estimated coefficients behave according to expectations and tend 
to reproduce those in previous empirical studies analyzing the determinants of subjective 
well-being. Thus, the results show that age has a negative effect on the citizens 
satisfaction with education. We also observe that satisfaction decreases with the level of 
education of the respondent, with the exception of specifications (5) and (6), where the 
effect of both levels of secondary education is positive. These results suggest that more 
educated citizens are more critical of the delivery of the education service. Citizenship 
also has a negative and significant effect on citizens’ satisfaction with their education 
system, thus foreigners are less satisfied with the educational service than natives. Here 
we have to take into account the fact that only 3.4% of the sample observations are from 
individuals without citizenship. The self-reported health status of an individual has a 
negative impact on citizens’ perception of the education system. Right-wing individuals 
tend to be more satisfied with their education system than their left-wing counterparts. 
Household size also has a positive and significant effect (only negative and significant in 
the first specification). In terms of job status compared to unemployed citizens, students, 
and disabled citizens, being a paid worker, homeworker, or retired has a positive and 
significant effect on satisfaction with the education system. 
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Table 6: Results for the estimation of equation (2) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Sat. Educ.  Sat. Educ.  Sat. Educ.  Sat. Educ.  Sat. Educ.  Sat. Educ.  Sat. Educ.  Sat. Educ.  Sat. Educ.  
                    
Age -0.0216*** -0.0210*** -0.0217*** 0.0226*** 
 
-0.0217*** -0.0224*** -0..0228*** -0.0219*** -0.0221*** 
 (0.0018) 
 
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
 
 
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Age squared 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Education (Base: Primary education)          
Low secondary education -0.1750*** -0.0245 0.0035 -0.0631* 0.0862* 0.0928*** -0.1011*** 0.0303 0.0420* 
 (0.0192) 
 
(0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0193) 
 
(0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0191) 
Upper secondary education -0.3193*** -0.1042*** -0.0658*** -0.1783*** 0.0337** 0.0521*** -0.2078** -0.0174 -0.0033 
 (0.0180) 
 
(0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0181) 
 
(0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0181) (0.0177)  (0.0176) 
Post secondary education -0.4051*** -0.2177*** -0.2146*** -0.2825*** -0.0958*** -0.0908** -0.3319*** -0.1701*** -0.1701*** 
 (0.0368) 
 
(0.0369) (0.0372) (0.0370) 
 
(0.0370) (0.0374) (0.0369) (0.0369) (0.0373) 
Tertiary education -0.3641*** -0.1704*** -0.1525*** -0.2521*** -0.0610*** -0.0541*** -0.2869*** -0.1165*** -0.1115*** 
 (0.0188) 
 
(0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0189) 
 
(0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0186) (0.0185) 
Citizenship -0.2514*** -0.2226*** -0.2605*** -0.3206*** -0.2949*** -0.3080*** -0.2824*** -0.2578*** -0.2741*** 
 (0.0304) 
 
(0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0305) 
 
(0.0307) (0.0308) (0.0305) (0.0306) (0.0307) 
Self reported health -0.1930*** -0.1881*** -0.1982*** -0.1712*** -0.1659*** -0.1769*** -0.1869*** -0.1830*** -0.1900*** 
 (0.0066) 
 
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
 
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
Left-Right wing scale 0.0412*** 0.0481*** 0.0437*** 0.0328*** 0.0390*** 0.0374*** 0.0384*** 0.0443*** 0.0417*** 
 (0.0024) 
 
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
 
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Number of people living in household -0.1750*** 0.0467*** 0.0488*** 0.0250*** 0.0329*** 0.0366*** 0.0383*** 0.0466*** 0.0463*** 
 (0.0039) 
 
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
 
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
Job status (Base: Unemployed)          
Paid work 0.1082*** 0.1099*** 0.0880*** 0.1314*** 0.1328*** 0.1170*** 0.1181*** 0.1182*** 0.1061*** 
 (0.0222) 
 
(0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0223) 
 
(0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0225) 
Student 0.2317*** 0.2730*** 0.2294*** 0.2401*** 0.2794*** 0.2576*** 0.2366*** 0.2712*** 0.2474*** 
 (0.0287) 
 
(0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0289) 
 
(0.0290) (0.0292) (0.0288) (0.0289) (0.0292) 
Disabled 0.0501 0.0575 0.0668*** 0.0438 0.0504 0.0581 0.0449* 0.0508 0.0490 
 (0.0404) 
 
(0.0407) (0.0409) (0.0406) 
 
(0.0408) (0.0411) (0.0405) (0.0407) (0.0410)  
Military service 0.4376*** 0.4362*** 0.4509*** 0.2956** 0.2912** 0.3548** 0.3698*** 0.3796*** 0.3898*** 
 (0.1273) 
 
(0.1282) (0.1365) (0.1278) 
 
(0.1286) (0.1373) (0.1276) (0.1283) (0.1370) 
Homework 0.2143*** 0.2050*** 0.2010*** 0.2398*** 0.2315*** 0.2265*** 0.2277*** 0.2188*** 0.2149*** 
 (0.0275) 
 
(0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0276) 
 
(0.0278) (0.0279) (0.0275) (0.0277) (0.0278) 
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Retired 0.2254*** 0.2623*** 0.2504*** 0.2493*** 0.2841*** 0.2762*** 0.2384*** 0.2693*** 0.2617*** 
 (0.0272) 
 
(0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0273) 
 
(0.0275) (0.0276) (0.0273) (0.0274) (0.0276) 
          
GDP per capita current 2005 1.57e-5*** 1.49e-5*** 1.65e-5*** 1.62e-5*** 1.47e-5*** 1.60e-5*** 1.95e-5*** 1.75e-5*** 1.90e-5*** 
 (4.76e-07) 
 
(4.55e-07) (4.45e-07) (4.75e-07) 
 
(4.60e-07) (4.58e-07) (4.62e-07) (4.48e-07) (4.41e-07) 
Expenditure in education as % GDP 0.1126*** 0.1157*** 0.0263*** 0.0953*** 0.0989*** 0.0544*** 0.1685*** 0.1665*** 0.1258*** 
 (0.0062) 
 
(0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0063) 
) 
(0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0062) (0.0067) (0.0069) 
Unemployment rate 0.0202*** 0.0281*** 0.0206*** 0.0083*** 0.0160*** 0.0089*** 0.0149*** 0.0206*** 0.0179*** 
 (0.0019) 
 
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
 
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
          
Math score 0.0183*** 
*** 
0.0189*** 
 
0.0178***       
 (0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0002)       
Reading score    0.0212*** 0.0222*** 0.0199***    
    (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)    
Science score       0.0196*** 0.0194*** 0.0180*** 
       (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
          
Gross enrollmet primary -0.0528*** 
*** 
  -0.0514***   -0.0447***   
 (0.0012) 
 
  (0.0012)   (0.0028)   
Gross enrollmet secondary  0.0027*** 
 
  0.0019***   0.0032*** 
33*** 
 
  (0.0006) 
 
  (0.0005) 
 
) 
  (0.0005)  
Gross enrollmet tertiary   0.0172***   0.0104***   0.0094*** 
   (0.0005)   (0.0005)   (0.0005) 
          
Constant 0.3316* 
 
-6.0615*** 
 
-5.6192*** -1.1459*** -7.5141*** -6.4794** -2.0286*** -6.7417*** -5.9169*** 
 (0.1820) 
 
(0.1186) 
 
(0.1176) (0.2011) (0.1392) (0.1440) (0.3121) (0.1256) (0.1299) 
          
Observations 136.885 136.885 134.989 136.885 136.885 134.989 136.885 136.885 134.989 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.2- Country-level variables 
Estimated coefficients for the country-level controls, including our key explanatory 
variables (efficiency and equity), are reported in the bottom half of Table 7. We first 
comment on the estimated coefficients for the macroeconomic country-level indicators. 
Our estimations indicate that government expenditure on education has a statistically 
significant effect on citizens’ assessment of the education service. This effect is positive. 
The overall national unemployment rate has a positive and statistically significant impact 
on the satisfaction of individuals with the education system. This result is interesting, as 
it indicates that in Europe the unemployment rate does not affect citizens’ opinion of the 
education system as one may expect. National GDP per capita is also significant and 
positive. 
 
Now we focus on our variables of interest: the efficiency and equity variables. As we 
mention above, the econometric analysis comprises nine specifications. In each 
specification we include one efficiency and one equity indicator. The results for these 
variables are shown at the bottom of Table 7. 
 
Our results indicate that both efficiency and equity matter for citizens’ assessment of the 
education system. The effect of efficiency proxied as PISA national scores in 
mathematics, reading, and science exerts an unequivocal positive and statistically 
significant impact on the assessment of the education system. This indicates that in 
countries with higher PISA scores their citizens have a better assessment of their 
education system. Indeed, the estimated marginal effects are similar for the three scores. 
For mathematics scores (models 1 to 3), marginal effects range from 0.0178 to 0.0189, 
while these figures are 0.0199 to 0.0222 and 0.0180 to 0.0196 for reading and science 
scores, respectively. 
 
In contrast to the efficiency indicators, equity variables proxied as the enrollment rate by 
education level exhibit an ambiguous effect. The direction of the impact depends on the 
level of education considered. The gross enrollment rate in primary education reports a 
negative sign, while the effect is positive for the gross enrollment rate in secondary 
education and in higher education. This result might indicate that citizens do not 
consider compulsory education as an additional factor that may raise their assessment 
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of the education system, as they take it for granted that compulsory education has to be 
made available for everyone. However, citizens positively value the effort made by 
governments to universalize post-compulsory education (secondary and tertiary), with 
the magnitude of the impact for secondary education being larger than for tertiary 
education. This result is robust independent of the PISA score with which the respective 
enrollment ratio is combined. 
 
In order to allow for comparisons across alternative models, in Table 8 we report the 
estimated elasticities. The three estimated elasticities associated with the efficiency 
variables are quite similar in magnitude. A 10% increase in the level of PISA scores in 
mathematics, reading, and science heightens citizens’ perception of the education system 
by between 19.0% and 20.3%, 21.2% and 27.0%, and 19.4% and 21.2%, respectively. 
Focusing on the equity variables, a 10% increase in the level of gross enrollment rate in 
primary education decreases the level of citizens’ perception of the education system by 
between 10.2% and 11.9%. In contrast, a 10% increase in the gross enrollment rate in 
secondary education increases the level of satisfaction by 0.4% to 0.7% depending on the 
specification. Finally, if we increase the gross enrollment rate in tertiary education by ten 
percent, the satisfaction with the education system is increased by a range of 1.2% to 
2.3%. Estimated elasticities reveal that citizens value efficiency more than equity in their 
assessment of the education system. 
 
Table 8: Estimated elasticities for the efficiency and equity variables 
Math  1.9733 2.0350 1.908       
 82.72 83.61 77.41       
Read    2.706 2.3801 2.1293    
    75.95 77.53 66.35    
Science       1.9870 2.1133 1.9485 
       78.51 82.75 70.63 
Primary -1.1932   -1.1583   -1.0210   
 -43.87   --42.5   -37.22   
Secondary  0.0613   0.0438   0.0748  
  4.66   3.30   5.69  
Tertiary   0.2374   0.1438   0.1299 
   34.95   19.82   17.91 
z statistic in italics 
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7- Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed the effect of educational efficiency and equity on citizens’ 
satisfaction with their country’s education system. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first study to address this question. With this aim in mind, we resort to the six 
available waves of the ESS and match them with countries’ educational efficiency and 
equity proxies in order to carry out a cross-country analysis controlling for individual 
and country characteristics. 
 
First, we estimated an econometric model in which the results highlighted that the 
educational efficiency proxies had an unequivocal positive effect on citizens’ satisfaction 
with their education system. The PISA achievement scores usually appear in the media 
and are a matter of conjecture among different society and government actors. Because 
PISA has acquired a certain prestige, these scores are perceived as a reliable indicator of 
the functioning of education in many countries. As a result of this, governments make 
efforts to improve in the ranking. For instance, as a consequence of being in the last 
position of the last PISA ranking, there has been a private initiative in Peru to create an 
alternative education system to the public one. Bad results in other South American 
countries such as Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil have also prompted public debate 
about the state of the education system in these countries. In Spain, the current 
government has promoted deep reform of the education system. One of the main 
arguments in favor of this reform was the poor performance of Spanish students in the 
PISA tests relative to their European counterparts. 
 
The results for the equity measures provide more ambiguous results, depending on what 
educational level we are analyzing. The equity measure for primary education has a 
negative and significant effect on the citizens’ assessment of the education system, while 
this effect is positive for secondary and tertiary education. Our results show that for a 
10% increase in the level of the gross enrollment rate in primary education, citizens’ 
perception of the education system decreases by between 10.2% and 11.9%. This result 
suggests that citizens may not attach importance to primary education, as it is 
compulsory. Primary education is a basic service covered in all developed countries and 
citizens may not consider it a priority in comparison to secondary and tertiary education. 
In contrast, citizens have a positive valuation of government efforts to increase the equity 
of opportunities in secondary and tertiary education, whose levels that are not 
compulsory. This effect is bigger for tertiary education, where a 10% increase in the gross 
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enrollment rate increases citizens’ satisfaction by between 1.2% to 2.3% in comparison 
with an increase between 0.4% and 0.7% for secondary education. As we noted in 
Section 3, this result is counter-intuitive, as the first stages of education are crucial in 
later stages (i.e., primary education is the input for secondary education), and 
policymakers should take heed of these factors, especially of long-term effects such as 
student achievement, grade retention, employment, earnings, crime prevention, health, 
and family relationships. 
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